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Executive Summary 
 
 
This report identifies a set of universal performance indicators for specialized “problem-solving 
courts” and related experiments in problem-solving justice. Traditional performance indicators 
related to caseload and processing efficiency can assist court managers in monitoring case flow, 
assigning cases to judges, and adhering to budgetary and statutory due process guidelines. Yet, 
these indicators are ultimately limited in scope. Faced with the recent explosion of problem-
solving courts and other experiments seeking to address the underlying problems of litigants, 
victims, and communities, there is an urgent need to complement traditional court performance 
indicators with ones of a problem-solving nature. 
 
With funding from the State Justice Institute (SJI), the Center for Court Innovation conducted an 
investigation designed to achieve three purposes. The first was to establish a set of universal 
performance indicators against which to judge the effectiveness of specialized problem-solving 
courts, of which there are currently more than 3,000 nationwide. The second purpose was to 
develop performance indicators specific to each of the four major problem-solving court models: 
drug, mental health, domestic violence, and community courts. The third purpose was to assist 
traditional court managers by establishing a more limited set of indicators, designed to capture 
problem-solving activity throughout the courthouse, not only within a specialized court context.  
 
Methodology 
The findings in the report are based on multiple methods. We conducted a literature review of 
existing problem-solving court evaluations and performance measures. We held two focus 
groups, one focused on New York State and the other on national problem solving experiments, 
in which a broad range of practitioners participated. We also conducted in-depth qualitative 
interviews with eight additional experts. After formulating initial conclusions, we then reviewed 
our findings with two final groups. First, we presented findings to a roundtable of judges and 
court administrators in a single county (Bronx, New York) that maintains a wide range of 
problem-solving courts and high-volume traditional courts. Second, at the Center for Court 
Innovation, we presented findings to the research department and senior managers who oversee 
initiatives related to drug courts, mental health, domestic violence, and community courts.  
 
Organizing Principles 
Based on our research, the performance indicators can be grouped into three organizing 
principles: problem-solving orientation, collaboration, and accountability: 
 
• Problem-Solving Orientation: This principle indicates a focus on solving the underlying 
problems of litigants, victims, or communities. The concept often implies an interest in 
individual rehabilitation; but sometimes the defining “problems” of interest belong less to 
the presenting litigant than to the victims of crime, including the larger community. 
 
• Collaboration: This principle highlights the role of interdisciplinary collaboration with 
players both internal and external to the justice system, including court administrators, 
judges, attorneys, supervision agencies, service providers, and community members. 
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• Accountability: This principle focuses on promoting compliance by participants/litigants, 
quality services among service providers, and accountability by the court itself to the 
larger community to implement its intended model and track its performance. 
 
Under each organizing principle, the following sections outline the major goals and objectives of 
problem-solving justice. Specific performance indicators are detailed in the body of the report. 
 
Universal Performance Indicators for Problem-Solving Courts 
Our first set of recommendations involves performance indicators that are universally applicable 
to all problem-solving courts (see Chapter 5 – Tables 5.1 to 5.3). 
  
Problem-Solving Orientation: We developed five goals within this category:  
1. Individualized Screening and Problem Assessment 
• Objective a: Potential participants/litigants are screened and assessed 
• Objective b: Early identification through coordination with courthouse staff 
2. Individualized Treatment or Service Mandate 
• Objective a: Court links participants/litigant to appropriate services 
• Objective b: Court uses continuum of treatment modalities/services 
• Objective c: Court revisits treatment plan/mandate based on progress/compliance 
3. Direct Engagement of Participant/Litigant 
• Objective a: Judge engages in direct interaction with participant/litigant 
• Objective b: Judge explains responsibilities and decisions to participant/litigant 
• Objective c: Court staff and attorneys engage with participants/litigants 
4. Focus on Outcomes 
• Objective a: Court retains participants/litigants in program 
• Objective b: Court focuses on behavior changes beyond case completion 
5. System Change 
• Objective a: Stakeholders learn about underlying causes of justice involvement 
• Objective b: Court reaches sizable population of defendants or other litigants 
 
Collaboration: We identified three goals within this category: 
1. Justice System Collaboration 
• Objective a: Justice stakeholders collaborate on court policies and case decisions 
2. Social Service Provider Collaboration 
• Objective a: Court and service providers collaborate to offer services  
• Objective b: Court and service providers both participate in case review meetings  
3. Community Collaboration 
• Objective a: Court and community are mutually responsive  
 
Accountability: We identified three goals within this category: 
1. Offender Accountability 
• Objective a: Participant/litigant progress monitored 
• Objective b: Participants/litigants have practical incentive to complete mandates 
• Objective c: Participants/litigants understand and expect specific penalties and 
incentives (in response to noncompliance or progress)  
• Objective d: Participants/litigants expect sanctions/incentives to match behavior 
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2. Service Provider Accountability 
• Objective a: Service providers accurately and regularly inform court about 
participant/litigant progress 
• Objective b: Service providers use a specified and effective program model 
• Objective c: Court assesses social service delivery 
3. Court Accountability 
• Objective a: Court relies on up-to-date data for case decisions and tracking 
• Objective b: Court monitors its implementation and outcomes 
• Objective c: Court coordinated by single point person  
 
Performance Indicators for Four Problem-Solving Court Models 
The second set of recommendations provides performance indicators that are unique to drug, 
mental health, domestic violence, and community courts (see Chapter 6 – Tables 6.1 to 6.4). 
 
Drug Courts: These courts seek to ameliorate the circumstances that led to substance abuse with 
program mandates of a substantial length, usually one year or longer. Key goals and objectives 
beyond those that are relevant for all problem-solving courts involve: 
 1. Individualized Screening and Assessment 
• Target substance abusers 
• Target offenders who would otherwise face significant legal sanctions 
 2. Focus on Outcomes 
• Reduce drug use 
 
Mental Health Courts: Mental health courts focus on rehabilitating defendants through a 
substantial period of court-mandated mental health treatment. Specific goals and objectives are: 
 1. Individualized Screening and Assessment 
• Target mentally-ill defendants 
• Target offenders who would otherwise face significant legal sanctions 
 2. Focus on Outcomes 
• Reduce mental health symptoms and increase independent functioning 
 3. System Change 
• Increase understanding of mental illness among court stakeholders 
 
Domestic Violence Courts: These courts have a particular focus on victim safety, victim 
services, and offender accountability. Specific goals and objectives are:  
1. Cohesive and Respectful Process for Victims 
o Accommodate and acknowledge victim needs for services and information 
2. Victim Safety 
o Victims linked with safety planning services 
3. Offender Accountability 
o Engage in close offender monitoring 
o Track conviction and sentencing outcomes 
4. System Change 
o Increased collaboration with domestic violence victim services 
o Courthouse-wide education about domestic violence 
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Community Courts: These courts focus on improving conditions in whole neighborhoods, not 
only on addressing individual litigant needs. As such, they are uniquely accountable to the 
communities they serve and uniquely concerned with community input. Specific goals and 
objectives are: 
1. Community Collaboration 
o Court solicits information about community needs 
o Court maintains community presence 
2. Community Restitution 
o Court requires offenders to perform restitution 
o Court regularly reports on performance to community 
 
Problem-Solving Performance Indicators for Traditional Courts 
The final set of recommendations is for traditional courts seeking to implement and measure 
problem-solving activity throughout a courthouse, not only in specialized courts. The indicators 
are designed to provide efficient and low- or no-cost tools for traditional courts. At minimum, we 
recommend that courts track the number of litigants who are mandated to each type of alternative 
sanction and their compliance rates. Other objectives are as follows (see Chapter 7 – Table 7.1): 
 1. Problem-Solving Orientation: 
• Individualized screening and problem assessment: Court screens or assesses 
potential litigants for key circumstances, including drug and alcohol use, mental 
illness, and prior court involvement. 
• Individualized service mandate: Court tracks the number of litigants linked to 
each type of service, including community service, drug treatment, mental health 
treatment, batterer program, GED class, and parenting class. 
• Focus on outcomes: Court achieves a positive outcome/completion rate for 
litigants assigned to each type of service mandate. 
• Direct engagement of participants: Court engages in clear communication to 
litigants, enhancing their understanding and confidence in court proceedings; and 
court solicits litigant feedback (in comment boxes or comment via website). 
• Courthouse training and education: Court educates staff about the context of 
offending and other litigant problems through informal and formal trainings. 
 2. Collaboration: 
• Social service provider collaboration: Court fosters linkage with community-
based service providers (maintaining an up-to-date provider list or making 
provider brochures, materials, or referral forms available in court). 
• Community collaboration: Court has presence in local community (for example, 
through presentations to community groups and user-friendly website about court 
services and case filing information) 
 3. Accountability: 
• Court accountability: Court routinely assesses up-to-date data that tracks 
mandates to each type of problem-solving intervention and court outcomes. 
• Early Coordination of information: Court routinely collects relevant case 
information; and litigants have access to forms, instructions and other information 
needed for a case. 
• Compliance review: Court requires defendants to return to court to report on 
compliance with mandates. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
Performance indicators are information points used to help program managers and other 
stakeholders assess whether an initiative is operating as intended. Such indicators are typically 
quantitative, consisting of numbers, percentages, or straightforward check-offs (yes or no). They 
capture whether intended activities are in fact taking place (“process indicators”) and whether 
those activities are achieving their desired goals (“impact indicators”).  
 
With funding from the State Justice Institute, the Center for Court Innovation sought to produce 
an inclusive set of problem-solving performance indicators. The investigation focused primarily 
on specialized “problem-solving courts,” with specific attention paid to drug, mental health, 
domestic violence, and community courts. However, the ultimate purpose was to assist all court 
managers, including those who oversee conventional courts, in tracking the extent to which their 
courts incorporate a problem-solving focus. This introductory chapter further delineates our 
purposes and describes how the report will be organized. 
 
The Rise of Specialized Problem-Solving Courts 
Over the past two decades, the “problem-solving court” movement has grown exponentially. The 
movement began with the creation of the Miami Drug Court in 1989. Since then, more than 
2,100 drug courts have opened nationwide (Huddleston, Marlowe, and Casebolt 2008). An array 
of other problem-solving court models have followed, including more than 200 domestic 
violence courts, 200 mental health courts, 30 community courts, and 500 other courts, including 
homeless, truancy, teen, sex offense, and veterans courts (see Center for Court Innovation 2009; 
Huddleston et al. 2008; Karafin 2008). To manage these experiments, 46 states have appointed a 
statewide drug court coordinator, and 13 have established the broader position of statewide 
problem-solving court coordinator. These 13 states reflect the full geographic and cultural 
diversity of the nation, including states as diverse as Alaska, California, Indiana, New York, and 
Utah. 
 
Problem-solving courts each seek to address a different set of problems, from systemic concerns 
such as exponential increases in criminal caseloads, growing jail and prison populations, and 
decreasing public confidence in justice, to individual-level problems like drug addiction, 
domestic violence and community disorganization. Yet, several authors have sought to identify 
common elements that these courts share, either by capturing the views of judges (Farole et al. 
2004) or developing an original synthesis (e.g., Berman and Feinblatt 2001; Casey and Rottman 
2003; Wolf 2007). Commonly cited problem-solving court elements include a collaborative 
approach to decision-making; individualized justice for each litigant; a focus on defendant 
accountability; community engagement; enhanced information through staff trainings and better 
data collection on each case; and an interest in producing better substantive outcomes, such as 
lower recidivism, improved safety for victims, or stronger communities. 
 
It is perhaps their focus on the outcomes generated after a case has been disposed that most 
distinguishes problem-solving courts from conventional courts. Like all courts, problem-solving 
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courts seek to uphold the due process rights of litigants and to operate efficiently; but their 
outcome orientation demands that they seek to address the underlying issues that precipitate 
justice involvement.  
 
Of course, not all problem-solving courts confront the same problems, nor do they all contain 
analogous policies and practices. Domestic violence courts in particular differ from many of the 
elements found in drug and mental health courts (see Labriola et al. 2009). Many domestic 
violence courts provide extensive services to the victims of crime, as opposed to the focus of 
drug and mental health courts almost exclusively on the defendant/litigant. Furthermore, 
domestic violence court stakeholders do not all presume that community-based programs and 
services can successfully reduce the defendant’s underlying criminal propensities. In domestic 
violence courts, defendant accountability and deterrence from re-offending often emerge as more 
integral goals than defendant rehabilitation per se. 
 
Three Problem-Solving Court Paradigms 
In framing how problem-solving courts vary, three major paradigms can be identified: (1) 
therapeutic jurisprudence, (2) accountability, and (3) community justice.  
 
• Therapeutic Jurisprudence: This paradigm promotes a coordinated and remedial response to 
the underlying service needs of the involved parties, while still upholding the due process 
rights of all litigants (see Rottman and Casey 1999). The therapeutic jurisprudence paradigm 
is most commonly associated with drug and mental health courts, whose main purpose is to 
treat and rehabilitate the individual (i.e., reducing drug use, mental illness, and recidivism). 
 
• Accountability: This paradigm focuses less on treatment and more on holding defendants (or 
other litigants) responsible for their behavior and on increasing judicial supervision to deter 
future criminal behavior. The accountability paradigm is most commonly associated with 
domestic violence and sex offense courts and, as such, tends to be combined with an 
emphasis on victim services (see Labriola et al. 2007). 
 
• Community Justice: This paradigm stresses improving public trust in justice, the importance 
of restorative justice, and involving the local community in identifying the major problems to 
be addressed. Community courts are obviously the prime exemplar. Newer models such as 
homeless, and truancy courts also tend to emphasize their engagement with the community 
and its problems (Berman and Feinblatt 2005; Wolf 2006). 
 
Whereas some problem-solving court models can more easily be categorized as following one or 
another of the three core paradigms, they are not mutually exclusive. A range of therapeutic, 
accountability, and community justice-oriented activities can and typically do occur within all 
types of problem-solving courts. To offer but one example, besides their manifest emphasis on 
community engagement, most community courts link defendants to services in an effort to 
further their rehabilitation; and community courts are known for achieving better compliance 
rates than downtown courts, advancing the goal of accountability as well (see Kralstein 2005).  
 
To summarize, it is useful both to recognize the wide variation across today’s problem-solving 
court models as well as to conceptualize how these courts represent a general phenomenon. 
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Accordingly, this report will provide a set of general problem-solving court performance 
indicators, but their application or appropriateness may vary by model type – and for this reason, 
a separate chapter (chapter 6) will be devoted to indicators that are respectively unique to drug, 
mental health, domestic violence, and community courts. 
 
Problem Solving without Specialized Courts 
As problem-solving courts have spread and gained nationwide acceptance, interest has grown in 
a closely related idea: adopting the goals and methods of specialized problem-solving courts but 
without funneling cases into a separate, stand alone court (Farole et al. 2004, 2005). In recent 
years, the Conference of Chief Justices and Conference of State Court Administrators repeatedly 
validated such efforts. In a 2000 resolution, these conferences advocated for “Encourag[ing], 
where appropriate, the broad integration over the next decade of the principles and methods of 
problem-solving courts into the administration of justice to improve court processes and 
outcomes while preserving the rule of law.”  
 
In light of the 2000 resolution, which the Conferences reaffirmed again in 2004, the national 
commitment to problem-solving justice has continued to expand. Demonstrating this 
commitment, a CCI, BJA-funded random survey of general trial court judges nationwide found 
that 75 percent approved of using problem-solving methods in their current assignment, with 
most indicating that they already use one or more specific problem-solving practices (Farole 
2009). Furthermore, the Bureau of Justice Assistance recently completed a 10-site community-
based problem-solving demonstration project, where the sites were able to adopt a variety of 
approaches to problem-solving, not limited to the establishment of a stand alone “problem-
solving court” presided over a single, dedicated judge (Wolf 2007).  
 
Indeed, problem solving can encompass plea negotiations, judicial updates, and alternative 
sentencing – this even when they do not take place in discrete courts and are not identified as 
problem-solving interventions. If problem solving is increasingly happening outside of 
specialized courtrooms, court administrators will need standard ways to assess this activity, 
especially as it is still unknown whether problem solving on a general calendar is as efficacious. 
For this reason, our current project does not focus exclusively on performance indicators for 
specialized courts but seeks also to engage general court managers with simple ways to capture 
their problem-solving activities.  
 
Organization of This Report 
Our investigation proceeded as follows. First, before seeking to identify specific performance 
indicators, we sought to clarify the general goals, norms, and elements that most crucially define 
the substance and purpose of today’s experiments in problem-solving justice. Given the known 
differences across problem-solving models, we also needed to explore which goals or elements 
are specific to some, but not all, models. Accordingly, in presenting our findings, our analysis 
begins with the results of several broad-based literature review and original research activities. 
We then, in sequence, developed sets of performance indicators respectively (1) for all 
specialized problem-solving courts; (2) for each one of the four most established problem models 
– drug, mental health, domestic violence, and community courts; and (3) for problem-solving 
justice in general, whether implemented in or outside a specialized court setting. 
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Thus, the report is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the methodology for our 
investigation. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the literature to date regarding the effectiveness 
of problem-solving justice initiatives and, more importantly, regarding possible indicators to use 
for performance monitoring. Chapter 4 reports the results of two focus groups and interviews 
that were conducted to gain insight from practitioners on the major problem-solving goals and 
indicators that are appropriate for traditional as well as problem-solving courts. Chapters 5 
through 7 then present the major findings and conclusions of this investigation -- i.e., our 
recommended performance indicators: Chapter 5 proposes and describes a set of universal 
performance indicators for specialized problem-solving courts; Chapter 6 presents four sets of 
additional indicators, respectively tailored to drug, mental health, domestic violence, and 
community courts; and Chapter 7 proposes a core set of problem-solving performance indicators 
for use in traditional courts (i.e., by general court managers). Chapter 8 offers concluding 
thoughts and recommendations for next steps in disseminating the indicators proposed therein or 
similar ones to state court systems nationwide. 
 
 
 
 
What This Report Does Not Provide 
 
This report does not provide a single matrix to determine whether or to what degree an 
individual court practices problem-solving. The recommended indicators are intended to be 
used as a menu according to the priorities of individual court’s missions. We do not provide 
targets for success because this report is not intended as an instrument for evaluation, but 
rather as a tool that can help court managers – and evaluators – isolate those elements of the 
court that define its problem-solving capacity. It is our hope that courts will use these 
performance indicators to conduct site-specific priorities and thus be able to conduct 
evaluations that adhere to the fundamentals of problem-solving justice. 
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Chapter 2 
Methodology 
 
 
To develop preliminary indicators we used a combination of methods to collect data and then 
analyzed patterns to refine the indicators into three sets of performance indicators: for problem-
solving courts generally; for specific models of problem-solving courts; and for traditional 
courts. We combined a literature review, focus groups, stakeholder interviews, expert review, 
and the Center for Court Innovation’s previous experience in developing and researching 
experiments in problem solving justice. 
 
Literature Review 
The current investigation relied primarily on material that could point to replicable components 
of problem-solving courts and appropriate performance indicators. We did not draw upon 
research that focused on the minutia of problem-solving court implementation, though such 
research may be useful for individual courts, because the goal for this project was to develop a 
set of performance indicators that would be broad enough to be applied to a wide variety of 
problem-solving and traditional courts. The literature review included reviews of significant 
impact evaluations; implementation evaluations that were coupled with impact evaluations; and 
theoretical and other literature that attempted to develop models of problem-solving courts. 
Other relevant works related to the use of performance indicators in general, as well as a very 
small number of past publications that examined performance indicators in a problem-solving 
court context.  
  
Focus Groups 
Two focus groups were conducted early in the project, respectively in New York City and 
Atlanta, Georgia. Researchers from the Center for Court Innovation worked with the state Office 
of Court Administration, for the New York group, and with the Bureau of Justice Assistance 
(BJA), for the Atlanta group, to identify potential participants. Center staff then invited 
participants directly. 
 
Eligibility for focus group participation was based on experience working in problem-solving 
courts for at least two years; current involvement in a problem-solving court; or experience 
working in traditional courts for at least two years. The first focus group was held in New York 
City in March 2007 and was comprised of ten New York practitioners. They included two court 
administrators with specific problem-solving court oversight responsibilities, four general court 
administrators, one problem-solving court judge, two prosecutors, and one defense attorney. The 
second focus group was held in Atlanta, Georgia in May 2007, with representatives who were 
attending a two-day cross-site training hosted by the Center for Court Innovation, in coordination 
with a national meeting of BJA grantees. This group included stakeholders from BJA-funded 
community-based problem-solving initiatives in eight states. Participants in the New York focus 
group all knew each other while those in the national focus group held in Atlanta did not. 
Participants were not paid for their time, but refreshments were provided.  
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The focus groups were structured to generate expert experience and opinions about working in 
established problem-solving courts as well as assessing problem-solving practice from a general 
court perspective. Topic areas included court goals; eligibility and intake; working with 
colleagues in the court; case conferences; participant monitoring; measuring success and failure; 
and implications for traditional courts. The groups lasted between 90 minutes and two hours. 
They were moderated by two researchers from the Center for Court Innovation. One additional 
senior staff member from the Center sat in on the New York group.  
 
Focus groups were recorded and transcripts were analyzed. Transcripts provided exact quotes 
used throughout the analysis. All participants were informed that direct quotes would likely be 
used but not be personally attributed. 
  
Interviews 
To supplement the focus groups, a senior Center researcher conducted a series of targeted open-
ended interviews with established experts in problem-solving courts. Respondents all had at least 
ten years of experience with problem-solving courts and included administrators, researchers, 
attorneys, a direct service provider, and a judge. Eight interviews were conducted either in 
person or by telephone between June and October 2008. Interviews followed an instrument 
developed for this project and lasted approximately one hour each. They addressed three areas: 
(1) What were the major contributions of problem-solving courts; (2) How do problem-solving 
courts achieve their goals; and (3) What can traditional courts learn from problem-solving courts.  
 
Bronx Stakeholders Roundtable 
After the initial data was collected from the literature review, focus groups, and interviews, 
researchers developed a draft list of performance indicators for all problem-solving courts, for 
the four key problem-solving court models, and for traditional courts interested in examining 
their problem-solving potential (following the respective organization of chapters 5, 6, and 7 in 
this report). These findings were presented to a group of court stakeholders in a single 
jurisdiction (Bronx County, New York) in order to test whether the indicators met four criteria: 
1. They captured essential components of problem-solving courts; 
2. They adequately detailed differences between problem-solving court models; 
3. They could readily be implemented; and 
4. They provided realistic crossover measures for traditional courts. 
 
The roundtable was coordinated with the assistance of the Administrative Judge for Bronx 
County and the Office of the Chief of Policy and Planning at the New York State Office of Court 
Administration. Participants were invited based on: their experience in the jurisdiction; their 
experience with problem-solving courts; and the diversity of their professional roles. Ten people 
participated, including four judges and four administrators. Participants were given a brief 
presentation on the project and the indicators. They were then led in a 90-minute discussion by 
the principal researcher for the project. The Center’s research director also participated in the 
roundtable. The discussion was recorded and reviewed for analysis.  
 
Center for Court Innovation Review and Internal Roundtable 
The final research activities were two internal discussions capitalizing on internal expertise at the 
Center for Court Innovation. The first was a presentation and analysis with Center research 
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department staff. The second was a roundtable discussion with senior Center staff, including 
technical assistance directors of all four focal areas (drug, mental health, domestic violence, and 
community justice initiatives) as well as longstanding senior management. Many of the 
participants had contributed to a series of previous internal discussions that led to the Center’s 
own conceptual framework delineating the major elements of all experiments in problem-solving 
justice (see final product in Wolf 2007). 
 
The internal reviews were intended to elicit feedback on three elements: 
1. Whether the indicators successfully captured the essential functioning of problem-solving 
courts and other experiments in problem-solving justice; 
2. Whether the indicators were appropriately grouped across all courts and appropriately 
distinguished by court type (e.g., drug court or domestic violence courts); and 
3. Whether the indicators could feasibly be measured by problem-solving court staff or, as 
appropriate, by general court administrators. 
 
In both discussions, report goals were presented, and the group was led through the main 
findings tables (presented in Chapter 5 of this report). The discussions focused on detailed 
analysis and debate about the content and specifications of the tables. The discussion proceeded 
cell-by-cell and involved input from many senior staff, leading to a thorough review and 
enabling us to fine-tune the context and implications of each indicator. Finally, research staff 
paid particularly close attention to the usability of the indicators and the potential burden that 
data collection would play on court staff seeking to apply them to measure court performance. 
 
Data Synthesis 
To develop and refine the recommendations made in this paper we categorized data from all of 
the sources described here according to shared themes, foci, goals and perspectives. We 
examined each key concept identified in the literature and in interviews, focus groups and 
roundtable and attempted to reduce it to its essential quality related to problem-solving. From 
these we developed a set of court goals which we further defined by re-examining the categories 
and reordering them into court objectives that would contribute to each court goal. Finally, we 
distilled the final set of organizing principles from these goals and objectives seeking to include 
those elements most widely cited and those that, even when relatively uncommon, reflected the 
considerations of  the most inclusive group of experts, practitioners and stakeholders.   
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Chapter 3 
Findings from the Literature on Problem-Solving Courts 
 
 
This chapter will examine performance indicators that have been either explicitly identified or 
implicitly used in literatures that have assessed problem-solving courts. The examination 
incorporates indicators of success in implementation (e.g., did the courts perform the assessment, 
service linkage, judicial oversight, sanctioning, and other activities that they intended to 
perform?) and success in impact (e.g., did these activities in turn reduce recidivism, achieve 
higher compliance rates, or produce effective solutions to neighborhood problems?). 
 
This chapter first presents significant literature on the defining characteristics of problem-
solving courts. This literature, which typically offers suggested components or key “principles” 
of problem solving, provides the foundation for impact evaluations and practitioner guidelines. 
The second section provides an overview of the evaluation literature, synthesizing what has 
been learned from both the implementation and impact evaluation literature. The final section 
describes performance indicators from these literatures in this order: indicators used in 
implementation evaluations (process indicators); indicators used in impact evaluations (impact 
indicators); and indicators specific to each of four respective models: drug, mental health, 
domestic violence, and community courts. 
 
Defining Characteristics of Problem-Solving Courts 
Problem-solving courts have their antecedents in other alternative sentencing programs, 
including specialized dockets and family courts, stretching back decades. Some of these 
programs began through the impetus of judges and advocates interested in employing 
rehabilitative means to address the perceived causes of criminal offending (e.g., Hiller et al. 
1996). Other programs began through prosecutors’ offices seeking to use their coercive leverage 
to achieve similar therapeutic goals (Young 1996). Both efforts sought to reduce re-offending 
and increase public safety beyond what was apparently achieved through incarceration alone – in 
essence expanding the role of the court process from the administration of the law to a factor in 
remedying the problem of re-offending (e.g., Leukefeld and Tims 1988; Anglin et al. 1996). 
 
Problem-solving courts seek to adapt these goals to a comprehensive model that is neither 
charge-specific nor limited by the uncoordinated utilization that is fostered by unspecified 
eligibility criteria (as characterized many of the preceding efforts). While problem solving has 
entered mainstream court administration (New York State, for example, has more than 250 
problem-solving courts, and every other state has some), problem-solving approaches continue to 
reach only a small fraction of all court cases (Bhati, Roman, and Chalfin 2008). The potential for 
bringing the problem-solving court model to scale (including the significant cost-savings and 
crime-reduction that is associated with the model) remains largely unrealized and suggests the 
need to distill those components that can feasibly be replicated to incorporate more cases in more 
locales. 
 
Within the theoretical literature, several authors with extensive experience developing or 
evaluating these courts have sought to outline their central components. Perhaps the most widely 
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distributed is the document created in 1997 by the U.S. Department of Justice that identified 
what it called the ten “key components” relating to court orientation, collaboration among justice 
and non-justice actors, service utilization, and defendant obligations. Most documents that have 
followed have addressed these same themes, sometimes focusing on a specific model (e.g., Sack 
2002; Feinblatt and Berman 1997; Rubio et al. 2008) and sometimes on overarching principles 
intended to span all problem-solving court models (e.g., Wolf 2007). 
 
What follows is a summary of principles identified by five institutions involved closely in the 
development, implementation and evaluation of problem-solving courts in the United States.  
 
• Drug Courts Program Office (DCPO 1997) Defining Drug Courts: The Key Components: 
This document focuses on five areas of drug court function: judicial role, court activities, 
defendant accountability, interaction between court actors, and information management. 
While the document specifies drug courts, that is because these were the earliest problem-
solving courts; however, many of the same components have been used and referred to in the 
development and assessment of other problem-solving court models. The ten specific 
components cited within these areas are: 
1. Treatment that is integrated with case processing;  
2. Nonadversarial case processing in which prosecution and defense work with the judge to monitor 
the case; 
3. Rapid participant identification, assessment and placement into the drug court and into treatment; 
4. Defendant access to a continuum of therapeutic care as appropriate based on a clinical evaluation;  
5. Frequent monitoring of defendant compliance with all court mandates including reports from 
therapeutic and other social service providers and drug testing;  
6. Coordinated response to participant behavior that combines court and service agency authority 
with timely sanctions and incentives;  
7. Regular direct judicial interaction with participants as a monitoring mechanism that increases or 
decreases according to defendant compliance;  
8. Drug treatment court program evaluation to assess program implementation and impact in 
accordance with the treatment court model;  
9. Interdisciplinary education about the nature of addiction for court staff including the judge; and,  
10. Community partnerships with treatment and other social service agencies to maximize service 
availability for defendants and develop a range of community-based services that are 
knowledgeable about criminal justice populations and willing to work with them including after 
treatment court completion.  
 
• The Center for Court Innovation (2001, 2005, 2007): The Center for Court Innovation has 
created more than two dozen problem-solving courts and other experiments in problem-
solving justice, as well as provided technical assistance and independent evaluations of 
countless other such initiatives. In Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer (Berman and 
Feinblatt 2001), Good Courts (Berman and Feinblatt 2005) and, later, in Principles of 
Problem-Solving Justice (Wolf 2007), key Center staff collaborated to distill their 
experiences and identify several characteristic elements common to all problem-solving 
models. The more recent 2007 publication was designed to encompass not only specialized 
courts but also problem solving justice as implemented outside the specialized court context. 
In this publication, the Center understood problem solving to contain six common elements: 
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1. Enhanced information, including education of court staff, clinical assessment for placement, 
contextual information about the offence and offender and data systems that enable regular 
defendant monitoring as well as facilitate evaluation;  
2. Community engagement both to respond to community concerns about offending and its 
consequences and to develop a network of community-based social service providers who deliver 
therapeutic and other interventions for the offender and relevant third parties (such as family 
members);  
3. Collaboration between justice system actors that capitalizes on the intersection of law 
enforcement, corrections and prosecution at the court  to maximize understanding of how to best 
monitor offenders and assist them as they work to maintain law-abiding lifestyles; 
4. Individualized justice based on the premise that each offender must be individually assessed in 
order to understand the specific behaviors and circumstances that contribute to offending for that 
person, and that services and other interventions should dynamically meet the needs uncovered in 
that assessment;  
5. Offender accountability to the court, to victims, to their family members and to themselves as 
enabled through regular monitoring, rapid and appropriate sanctions upon behavior infractions 
and incentives for responsible and laudable behavior; and  
6. A focus on outcomes of the court through standardized and routine data collection that enables 
evaluation of court adherence to the model, cost burden and savings and court impact on 
recidivism, sobriety and social indicators of stability such as employment and family ties. 
 
• The RAND Corporation (2001) Drug Courts: A Conceptual Framework: Drawing together 
an expert panel of both in-house and external researchers, RAND developed a “conceptual 
framework” for drug courts. The resulting document (Longshore et al. 2001) acknowledged 
DCPO and other efforts, but distilled just five dimensions, which (although the authors do 
not propose it) could easily be generalized to other problem-solving court models. They are: 
1. Leverage or the legal jeopardy for court participants based largely on whether the court requires a 
guilty plea (that may be mitigated upon successful completion) for participation, and a 
corresponding incentive to avoid discharge;  
2. Population severity as measured both by criminal history (e.g., the ratio of felonies to 
misdemeanors in a person’s criminal record) and current charges as well as drug use and 
treatment history;  
3. Program intensity, specifically what is required of participants in terms of weekly hours of 
therapeutic and social service interventions, participant monitoring and additional obligations 
such as community service or fines;  
4. Predictability of response to participant behavior, specifically as indicated by the certainty and 
swiftness of sanctions for noncompliance, but also the use of incentives to reward compliance 
with court mandates; and  
5. Rehabilitation emphasis modeled on principles of restorative justice and therapeutic 
jurisprudence models that seek an interventionist, rather than strictly punitive, role (and culture) 
for the justice system in the lives of offenders. 
  
• The National Research Advisory Council (NRAC 2006):  Through a series of meetings, a 
group of experts in drug courts and mandated drug treatment developed a set of indicators for 
drug courts focusing on participant performance and post-program impact (see Heck and 
Thanner 2006). They are: 
1. Retention as a ratio of the number of people who complete the program to the total number of the 
people entering the program; 
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2. Sobriety based on professionally accepted drug screens such as urine samples (not self-report), it 
can be measured as length of time testing negative and/or number and decrease of positive tests 
over time in program; 
3. In-program recidivism, measured by the number of arrests during program participation and 
detailed by the type of offence committed; and 
4. Units of service, ideally detailing the content and quantity (hours/day, days/week) of therapeutic 
and other social services attended by the participant; and 
5. Post-program recidivism, an additional recommended measure, expands in-program recidivism 
to examine impact on behavior after program exit. 
 
It is noteworthy that the NRAC’s indicators, in contrast to those implied by the RAND and 
the Center for Court Innovation frameworks, do not posit long-term change in re-offending 
as a critical indicator of success – recidivism is noted in-program only. 
 
• National Center for State Courts (2003, 2008): In Problem-Solving Courts: Models and 
Trends (Casey and Rottman 2003), the National Center (NCSC) articulated key elements of 
several problem-solving models as well as “special issues” confronted by each model. 
Following that effort, NCSC developed their Problem-Solving Justice Toolkit, which 
describes recommended steps and resources to implement problem-solving models. While 
these documents do not propose a universal set of characteristics for all problem-solving 
courts, several common elements are detailed throughout. They are: 
1. Early intervention and rapid placement facilitated by clear case eligibility and extensive clinical 
assessment;  
2. The use of alternative sanctions to respond to offending and a corresponding willingness to spend 
more time on each case;  
3. The integration of social services with the sanction function of the court coupled with the 
resources and will to closely monitor adherence to sanctions and other court mandates; and  
4. Coordinated management of court process through collaboration with court actors and relevant 
community-based organizations.   
 
NCSC also developed a set of performance indicators for drug courts that could be readily 
applied to other courts mandating therapeutic interventions that expanded the NRAC 
indicators but reduced the original number of performance measures developed for trial 
courts (Rubio, Cheesman, and Federspiel 2008). NCSC is now continuing its research 
program in seeking to identify appropriate performance indicators for mental health courts.  
 
Taken together, these frameworks emphasize the importance of maintaining participant 
accountability through engagement with a dynamic and individualized sentencing process, rather 
than a prescribed and static sentence (e.g., jail, fine, conditional discharge, etc.). They highlight 
the centrality of defendant/litigant change of attitude and behavior through programs; and the 
importance of careful surveillance of offender behavior by the judge and other actors in a court. 
Court culture (e.g., proactive, collaborative, and reflecting an outcome orientation) and social 
science (e.g., use of effective behavior modification techniques) play critical roles in sustaining 
these components and in shaping the importance of improved and complete information on each 
case – coupled with formal training in social scientific findings and recommended practices. 
Finally, what emerges when the various lists of key elements are compared is the centrality of 
collaboration among justice system actors, community stakeholders, and litigants themselves. In 
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this regard, it is notable that the state of California developed the label “collaborative justice 
courts” to describe what are elsewhere known as “problem-solving courts.” 
 
Where these (and other) pieces most often differ is on defendant responsibilities and community 
engagement. Many problem-solving courts seek to address the underlying causes of criminal 
behavior (Casey and Rottman 2000; Hora et al. 1999). However, some models, notably domestic 
violence courts and to a lesser extent community courts, focus less on therapeutic interventions 
for the defendant and more on defendant responsibility to the party harmed – whether that is an 
individual or a community (Sack 2002; Sviridoff et al. 1997). 
 
The Evaluation Literature 
Research on Problem-Solving Court Implementation and Key Elements 
Frameworks such as those described in the previous section tend to describe a theoretical ideal 
while in practice many problem solving courts depart from these components. Implementation 
evaluations, on the other hand, can identify elements of problem-solving courts that are 
considered critical by court planners, funders, and other stakeholders. Often, studies of individual 
courts have used qualitative analyses of individual components (e.g., obtaining the views of court 
stakeholders or participants). 
 
As backdrop for this discussion it is useful to consider the degree to which research has 
documented whether any of these elements are efficacious. For example in a 2005 analysis, the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office found that most studies have not demonstrated the 
impact of key problem-solving courts elements, such as the role of the judge, the use of 
sanctions, and the impact of treatment programs (GAO 2005; see also Marlowe, DeMatteo, and 
Festinger 2003).  
 
Several rigorous studies have been conducted that have shown a positive impact of legal leverage 
(Rempel and DeStefano 2001; Young and Belenko 2002); judicial status hearings for “high risk” 
defendants (Marlowe et al. 2003); judicial sanctions (Harrell and Roman 2001); and intensive 
probation for domestic violence offenders (Klein and Crowe 2008). Bringing together many of 
these strands of analysis, two studies have sought to tease out the impact of multiple components 
in one analysis (Carey et al. 2008; Gottfredson et al. 2007). In the second of these studies, a 
randomized trial of the Baltimore Treatment Court, Gottfredson and colleagues (2007) found that 
the following practices all contribute to reduced crime or drug use: (1) more judicial status 
hearings, (2) more drug tests, (3) more days in treatment, and (4) greater participant perceptions 
of procedural justice.  
 
Although these findings have substantially increased what is known about what works, most of 
these studies convey results from only a single site. Furthermore, the effectiveness of any single 
element has been tested in, at most, two or three studies, and nearly all of the completed studies 
pertain only to adult drug courts. Consequently, most problem-solving court elements have yet to 
be validated with regard to their general impact on individual success. 
 
At the same time, problem-solving court stakeholders repeatedly point to the importance of many 
court characteristics as both defining and critical features for achieving successful outcomes. In a 
study of critical elements of problem-solving justice in California and New York, two states that 
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have widely embraced problem-solving courts, judges participating in focus groups emphasized 
four principles as critical in differentiating problem-solving courts from standard court models 
(Farole et al. 2004; see also Taxman 1999). They are: (1) an orientation towards the causes of 
criminal behavior (the “problem”) rather than the legal case outcome; (2) collaborative rather 
than adversarial case processing; (3) a proactive and interactive judge rather than a silent 
observer and arbiter; and (4) active solicitation of community input.  
 
Many implementation evaluations have followed the lead of the Department of Justice by 
assessing the fidelity of their site with reference to the 1997 “key components” document. For 
example, many implementation evaluators have described the frequency and nature of ongoing 
judicial oversight in drug courts and other problem-solving models. While most of these 
evaluations provided process indicators only and did not examine the impact of judicial status 
hearings, Marlowe and colleagues isolated updates to the judge as a significant predictor of court 
completion and reduced drug use, especially when participant risk of failure is high (Marlowe et 
al. 2003). However, Goldkamp and colleagues found a more equivocal position regarding the 
judge when they examined a long-standing drug court in Portland, Oregon. Their research does 
not question the importance of judicial status hearings per se, but their findings suggest that a 
single judge, long held to be a cornerstone of the drug court model, may not be critical to 
maintaining compliance or reducing recidivism (Goldkamp et al. 2001). This finding is 
particularly compelling for jurisdictions considering whether to assign dedicated judges to 
problem-solving courts or to implement problem-solving elements in traditional courtrooms. 
 
Many evaluations and planning documents have promoted the application of graduated sanctions 
as a key indicator that the court is fair and responsive to participant behavior (DCPO 1997; 
Frazer 2006). Two characteristics of the problem-solving model of sanctions are particularly 
noteworthy. First, graduated sanctions in drug courts imply an understanding of the dynamic 
nature of addiction and recovery that is significantly more nuanced than the approach to drug-
related crimes typically used in traditional courts. Specifically, graduated sanctions recognize 
that infractions are likely to occur, especially early in treatment, and need not be interpreted as 
indicative of defendant unwillingness or absolute inability to address addiction (Rempel et al. 
2003). Second and more critically, sanctions are defined as part of the treatment process. They 
are rehabilitative rather than retributive in intent (Miller and Shutt 2001). Whereas sanctions are 
consistently stressed in implementation evaluations and practitioner documents, there is some 
evidence that problem-solving courts do not always apply sanctions in a fashion that is consistent 
with best practices in behavior modification (Rempel et al. 2003; Labriola et al. 2009).  
 
Information Management: Several of the synthetic pieces described in the previous section 
identified enhanced information (Wolf 2007) or a focus on evaluation (DCPO 1997) as among 
the defining elements of problem-solving courts. These elements point to the importance of 
careful screening and psychosocial assessment (Miller and Shutt 2001), data management 
(Feinblatt and Berman, 1997), and reporting (Harrell and Roman, 2001). Through the 
implementation evaluation literature, it is evident that problem-solving courts engage in more 
extensive tracking and data collection than do traditional courts. While traditional courts have the 
capacity to track limited case processing measures such as time to arraignment, to key hearings, 
or to disposition, problem-solving courts routinely collect detailed electronic data about 
defendant psychosocial needs, social service placements and mandates, and compliance with 
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judicial orders. Problem-solving courts also collect information over time, allowing judges and 
other stakeholders to observe participant progress – and presumably to make suitable 
adjustments in response (SEARCH 2003; Heck 2006; Newmark et al. 2001).  
 
On the other hand, while the emphasis on data management is one of the defining features of the 
problem-solving court model, this feature is not always fully realized and can be one of the 
costlier elements of problem-solving courts (SEARCH 2003). Yet, tracking compliance has long 
been seen as critical in assuring that offenders do what courts tell them to do (McDonald 1986; 
Petersilia and Turner 1993). Additionally, for many models social services are an integral – and 
mandatory – component, used to develop offenders’ abilities to avoid anti-social behavior in the 
future. Indeed, many documents listing central problem-solving court elements cite the 
importance of access to treatment and other social services, frequently specifying availability of 
a “continuum of treatment” to address individual needs (e.g. Belenko 2001; Casey and Rottman 
2003; DCPO 1997; Feinblatt and Berman 1997; Sack 2002; The Council of State Governments 
2005).  
 
Not only is tracking important at the level of the individual participant (e.g., what services did 
each participant attend and with what level of compliance), but it can be a useful tool for 
monitoring the quality of service providers. Indeed, the National Institute of Justice notes that for 
drug courts, service delivery models are often incomplete, inconsistent, or improperly 
implemented (NIJ 2006; Anspach and Ferguson 2003).  
 
Research on Problem-Solving Court Impacts: A Brief Overview 
As has been noted elsewhere, many early evaluations of problem-solving courts (almost all of 
which were of drug courts) either did not examine court impacts or used insufficiently rigorous 
methodologies (e.g., see criticisms in Belenko 1998; Roman and DeStefano 2005). However as 
research increased and strengthened, the early optimism of many drug court advocates was 
confirmed in several studies that found adult drug court participants more likely to remain arrest-
free than similar offenders not participating in drug courts. One widely cited review found that 
48 of 55 studies detected lower recidivism rates among drug court participants than comparison 
groups composed of otherwise similar defendants (Wilson, Mitchell, and MacKenzie 2006). 
Other reviews examining different numbers of studies, and in some cases focusing only on those 
that employed a particularly strong methodology, have similarly concluded that adult drug courts 
reduce recidivism (Aos et al. 2001; Government Accountability Office 2005; Roman and 
DeStefano 2004; Shaffer 2006). 
 
Far fewer studies have been conducted of juvenile and family drug courts than of the adult 
model. Some propose that juvenile drug courts may be less successful, since juveniles do not 
tend to be addicted to drugs but, instead, face a series of other social or psychological problems, 
including involvement in deviant peer groups, low family functioning, poor educational 
performance, or developmental disabilities (Butts and Roman 2004). Indeed, a review of the 
juvenile drug court literature indicates mixed results, with about as many studies showing no 
effect as those showing a positive effect on re-offending (Kralstein 2008). This literature offers 
an important caution that not all problem-solving court models should be presumed equally 
effective. These results also suggest that exceptionally careful implementation of any juvenile 
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drug court (i.e., measured through appropriate “process indicators”) may be critical if the 
program is to exert a positive impact. 
 
A recent multi-site evaluation of four family drug courts from three different states found that 
participants were more likely to receive treatment and to be reunited with their children than 
comparison groups composed of otherwise similar litigants facing child abuse and neglect cases 
(Worcel et al. 2007). Although promising, this literature remains in an early stage of 
development. 
 
Research on mental health courts is less developed than adult drug courts. However, the small 
number of completed studies virtually all detected some effect on reoffending. Focusing on 
“second generation” mental health courts that incorporate ongoing judicial supervision, three of 
four evaluations reported significant recidivism reductions. The fourth study reported a 
significant reduction after one but not after two years (see Redlich et al. 2006 on defining 
“second generation” mental health courts; and evaluations by Bess 2004; Cosden et al. 2005; 
McNeil and Binder 2007; and Moore and Hiday 2006). According to a review of mental health 
court evaluations by Casey and Rottman (2003), these courts have also been shown to 
successfully link participants to treatment services, provide more services than participants were 
receiving prior to participation, and develop treatment plans based on individual needs.  
 
Domestic violence courts have produced mixed results in terms of both rehabilitation and 
recidivism – though many insist that these measures are less relevant for domestic violence 
courts. Of ten sites evaluated, three produced significant reductions in re-arrest rates (Gover, 
MacDonald, and Alpert 2003; Harrell et al. 2007; San Diego Superior Court 2000); five failed to 
show a positive effect (Harrell et al. 2007; Henning and Kesges 1999; Newmark et al. 2001), and 
two produced mixed results depending on the measures used (Harrell et al. 2006; Davis, Smith, 
and Rabbitt 2001).  
 
On the other hand, domestic violence courts have been able to achieve positive results in other 
areas. Several studies have found that these courts are more likely than non-specialized courts to 
engage in ongoing judicial supervision after sentencing (Newmark et al. 2001; San Diego 
Superior Court 2000); and to impose sanctions when defendants are noncompliant (Harrell et al. 
2006; Newmark et al. 2001; San Diego Superior Court 2000). Domestic violence courts have 
also been shown to link a much higher percentage of victims with services (Henning and Klesges 
1999; Newmark et al. 2001). Research indicates that these courts elicit higher victim satisfaction 
and fairness ratings than non-specialized courts (Eckberg and Podkopacz 2002; Gover et al. 
2003; Hotaling and Buzawa 2003); and increase the likelihood of victims expressing that they 
will report future violence and cooperate with future prosecutions (Newmark et al. 2001).  
 
Community courts are the last of the major problem-solving court models about which some 
research literature has emerged (see Kralstein 2005; Henry and Kralstein 2010). Like domestic 
violence courts, it is debatable whether recidivism reduction is an important or attainable goal, in 
the case of community courts due to the short mandates that most offenders receive. However, 
these courts have been shown more likely than traditional courts to link their defendants to 
alternative sanctions and less likely to use short-term jail sentences or “walks” (defined as fines, 
time served sentences, or conditional discharges without specific conditions attached).  
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At the Midtown Community Court, a recent study found that 74% of sentences involved 
community or social service, compared with 55% in the nearby downtown court (Hakuta, 
Soroushian, and Kralstein 2008). After implementing Bronx Community Solutions, a model that 
seeks to apply community court principles throughout a centralized courthouse, community and 
social service sanctions went up by 67%, whereas all other types of sentences decreased (Katz 
2009). Part of the rationale for the characteristically heavy use of community service sentences is 
to hold quality of life offenders accountable for restoring the harm that their behavior caused 
within the community. Indeed, in two separate studies, community courts were shown to have 
produced higher compliance rates than nearby traditional courts (Sviridoff et al. 2001; Weidner 
and Davis 2000). Unfortunately, the achievement of other community level outcomes, such as 
engaging local community members and incorporating their input has not been rigorously 
quantified through research – although many community court practitioners cite such outcomes 
as important (Karafin 2008). 
 
Considered as a whole, the problem-solving court impact literature demonstrates consistent 
attention to recidivism but also shows the relative dearth of consistent measures for the full range 
of elements that make problem-solving courts unique. Beyond recidivism, other outcomes that 
have been examined include: treatment retention rates; drug use; access to treatment; services for 
victims; offender compliance with court mandates; enforcement of noncompliance through 
imposition of further sanctions; distribution of misdemeanor sentencing options; case processing 
time; and dollar value of community service to the community. Yet these measures are not 
routinely applied by problem-solving courts around the country.  
 
Research on Performance Indicators 
 
A General Overview  
Performance indicators have been used in corporate, nonprofit, and public settings to measure 
activity against goals. These goals can be broad and systemic such as reducing 
neighborhoodcrime; they can be targeted goals such as reducing criminal behavior through the 
rehabilitation of offenders (e.g., as opposed to the mechanism of deterrence); or they can be 
activity-specific goals such as increasing accountability through increased judicial monitoring 
(Vera Institute of Justice 2003; Home Office 2008). At the program level, measures of specific 
activities (assessment, treatment linkages, judicial monitoring, etc.) allow program managers to 
assess the implementation of individual program elements and procedures. Clear and accurate 
performance indicators will demonstrate program success and failure – or at least demonstrate 
fidelity to the intended model. Performance indicators should distinguish between systemic 
outcomes –which typically are influenced by an array of factors – and specific outcomes that can 
reasonably be assumed to reflect the work of program staff and resources (Giuffrida et al. 1999). 
 
In a series of papers designed to assist programs in measuring outcomes, researchers at the Urban 
Institute and the Center for What Works developed a taxonomy of outcome indicators that 
differentiates between intermediate (or process) indicators and end (or impact) indicators 
(Lampkin et al. 2007). For example, a program may have an end goal of reducing recidivism, but 
assessing everyday performance may also require developing indicators for specific activities 
(conducting drug tests, holding judicial status hearings, assembling accurate progress reports, 
etc.).  
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The National Center for State Courts (NCSC) developed Courtools in 2005, a set of ten measures 
designed to assess the functioning of state courts. Those measures are: access and fairness; 
clearance rates; time to disposition; age of active pending caseload; trial date certainty; reliability 
and integrity of case files; collection of monetary penalties; effective use of jurors; court 
employee satisfaction; and, cost per case. These basic measures are useful for problem-solving 
courts because they assess the capacity of courts and capture elements of both procedural and 
substantive justice. The Courtools system is currently used in several states including California, 
Texas, Minnesota, and New York.  
 
In addition, NCSC recently updated their efforts to assist states in assessing drug court 
performance (Rubio et al. 2008). This project built on earlier efforts to use performance 
measures for trial courts, specifically those suggesting that effective performance measures 
should be limited in number, prioritized according to both resources and relevance, and 
shepherded with strong leadership.  
 
Applications to Problem-Solving Justice 
Performance indicators are a tool for administrators and managers to monitor program activities 
and make mid-course adjustments as needed (Cheesman, Rubio, and Duizend 2004; Heck and 
Thanner 2006). Evaluation plans and guides such as those produced by the National Drug Court 
Institute, Bureau of Justice Assistance, and the National Center for State Courts provide useful 
suggestions for both program measures and their indicators in data. 
 
Specifically the efforts of the National Research Advisory Committee, composed of national 
experts in drug courts, suggested that performance measures focus on: (1) retention, (2) sobriety, 
(3) in-program recidivism, and (4) units of service; and should be assessed within specified time 
periods to enssure that these measures reflect feasible outcomes (Heck 2006).  
 
In providing technical assistance to 12 states, NCSC expanded these measures considerably. The 
NCSC list added (5) time in program; (6) post-program recidivism; (7) accountability (through 
community service and maintaining financial obligations); (8) social functioning (e.g., 
maintaining employment, family and social ties); (9) program processing (a wide range of 
activities, such as screening efficacy, timeliness, monitoring, sanctions, incentives, and 
workload); (10) interaction with other agencies; (11) costs; and (12) quality adherence (to US 
Department of Justice’s “key components”). It is worth noting that none of the states that have 
implemented the NCSC approach have used all of these measures or even all of the domains 
(Rubio et al 2008).  
 
Specific Problem-Solving Court Models: Unique Issues and Applications  
As the above review suggests, the most robust literature about problem-solving courts addresses 
drug courts in particular. The three other models specifically addressed in this report use several 
drug court principles but diverge in key respects. This section will briefly address elements of 
those three models mental health courts, domestic violence courts and community courts that 
differ from the literature already discussed. 
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• Mental Health Courts are designed to use problem-solving methods to increase the 
responsiveness of the criminal justice system to seriously mentally-ill offenders, linking them 
with needed social and health services in an effort to reduce the likelihood of re-offense. 
These courts typically accept participants accused of more diverse and more serious offenses 
than most other problem-solving courts, trying to use positive incentives to help participants 
avoid jail sanctions (Council of State Governments 2005, Griffin, Steadman, and Petrilla 
2002). Mental health courts are particularly attentive to the legal and ethical limitations 
regarding coercion – since court participants may have particular difficulties understanding 
that choosing to participate is truly their choice (O’Keefe 2006). This attention to participant 
autonomy in the decision to enter and remain in a mental health court also affects the 
willingness of these courts to rely heavily on sanctions to maintain compliance. Mandates are 
fluid, as the court relies heavily on reports from clinicians to assess the utility of various 
interventions (NYUCS 2008). While mental health courts seek reductions in recidivism just 
as drug courts do, they also seek a range of other outcomes including fewer hospitalizations, 
compliance with medication schedules, stable employment and family contact (Ridgely 
2007; O’Keefe 2006). 
 
• Domestic Violence Courts are unique in focusing heavily on the court experience of the 
victim. In domestic violence courts, there is substantially less identification of the defendant 
as a “participant” and, indeed, the goal at the heart of these courts is victim safety. Unlike 
drug or mental health courts, the involvement of defendants is typically mandatory – based 
on charge or relationship criteria; the defendant cannot opt for conventional case processing 
instead. Of even more fundamental significance, while domestic violence court defendants 
are often mandated to batterer programs, there is significant skepticism about the efficacy of 
treatment for domestic abuse, based on research literature that has indicated little reduction in 
offending (see Babcock, Green, and Robie 2004; Feder and Wilson 2005). Domestic violence 
courts use programs where they are available, but in some courts, the programs are used 
more to occupy an offender’s time and monitor offender behavior than to behavioral change. 
Indeed, monitoring is one of the primary functions of these courts (Newmark et al 2001; 
Mazur and Aldrich 2003). So while accountability is an element of all problem-solving 
courts, it is uniquely central as an outcome for domestic violence courts and can be measured 
by the rate of domestic violence arrests, prosecutions, and convictions; and by sentencing 
severity. For cases that do not warrant a jail sentence, some have proposed that the offenders 
are held accountable to the extent that the court imposes swift and certain sanctions in 
response to noncompliance with probation, batterer program attendance, judicial monitoring, 
or other court conditions (Harrell et al. 2007; Labriola et al 2007; Mazur and Aldrich 2003).  
 
In part since it is questionable whether long-term recidivism reductions can be feasibly 
anticipated, domestic violence court impacts, unlike those for many other problem-solving 
courts, tend to be principally concerned with during-program rather than post-program 
events. The response to non-compliance is designed to send a message to the defendant, the 
victim and the larger community that domestic violence is unacceptable. More than any other 
problem-solving court, domestic violence courts devote resources to victim services and 
support (Mazur and Aldrich 2003). Therefore, effectiveness in serving victims is repeatedly 
examined in the research literature (Newmark et al 2001; Harrell et al 2007; Labriola et al. 
2009). 
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• Community Courts focus on improving safety in communities affected by crime. These 
courts are typically hear low-level misdemeanor cases that affect communities directly, such 
as prostitution, shoplifting, and pick-pocketing. Because the crimes do not carry long 
sentences, the court intervention is shorter than in other problem-solving courts and focused 
on restitution as much as rehabilitation. However, community courts also focus on participant 
needs by conducting assessments similar to those used in other problem-solving models and 
providing access to services through on-site providers and referrals to providers in the 
community (Henry and Kralstein 2010). A key goal of community courts is to restore public 
confidence in justice by engaging local residents in the justice process. Accordingly, many 
community courts take pains to measure community attitudes towards courts, local crime and 
other relevant neighborhood conditions. 
 
Constraints in Measurement: A Cautionary Note 
Generally, both research guides and recommendations for performance measurement are written 
for specific models of problem-solving courts (primarily drug courts), and typically assume that 
courts have an independent research capacity. Consequently, they may be impractical or 
prohibitive for many court practitioners. Scant literature exists that explicitly describes measures 
that could be taken from evaluations and feasibly transferred to managers of problem-solving 
courts, who seek to monitor and respond to their courts’ successes and setbacks, without adding 
impractical costs that might be involved if new research staff had to be hired and new 
management information systems developed. 
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Chapter 4 
The View from the Ground: Findings from Focus Groups and 
Interviews with Experts in Problem-Solving Justice  
 
 
To supplement the literature review, we conducted two focus groups in 2007, one in New York 
City with criminal justice professionals from that metropolitan area, and one in Atlanta with 
national practitioners. Participants included attorneys, administrators and practitioners. 
Additional interviews with experts in problem-solving justice were conducted in 2008. Finally, 
researchers conducted a practitioner roundtable discussion about preliminary findings in early 
2009. This chapter presents findings from all of these activities as follows.  
• Court Goals: In the first section, we discuss goals for problem-solving justice, as 
identified in the focus groups and interviews, and how stakeholders distinguish between 
goals associated with problem solving and those associated with traditional courts.  
• Problem-Solving Court Performance Indicators: The second section describes indicators 
suggested by the discussions and interviews for problem-solving courts generally and the 
four problem-solving models: drug, mental health, domestic violence and community 
courts.   
• Problem-Solving Justice in Traditional Courts: The final section describes stakeholder 
views on key indicators for traditional courts seeking to measure their problem-solving 
capacity and activities. 
 
Court Goals 
In comparing goals of traditional sentencing with those of problem solving, many stakeholders 
indicated that the entire notion of “goals” receives greater emphasis in problem-solving courts 
than in their traditional counterparts. In a traditional context, according to some stakeholders, 
court goals were viewed largely as an administrative concern, with the emphasis on court volume 
and case flow. In problem-solving courts, goals relate to individual or community outcomes 
more than to case processing outcomes. For example, one attorney compared the traditional goal 
of average time from arraignment to disposition with the problem-solving goal of a defendant 
remaining arrest-free and drug-free.1 
 
Case Processing, Recidivism, and Individual Outcomes 
Experts generally agreed that traditional courts typically view case processing efficiency as a 
central outcome of interest. Thus, indicators related to efficiency, number of cases, time to 
arraignment, and time to disposition are routinely collected and assessed. While several people 
noted that traditional courts are interested in recidivism, both in the focus groups and the 
interviews respondents acknowledged that recidivism data was not collected because it was 
considered beyond the court’s control and therefore not critical in assessing court performance.  
 
In contrast, experts generally perceived recidivism as a primary outcome measure for problem-
solving courts. Indeed, several people cited recidivism as the key measure by which problem-
                                                 
1 Identification in parentheses indicates focus group number and page of transcript. 
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solving courts should be judged. One respondent went so far as to say that any crime committed 
at any point after entry into a problem-solving court (she exempted domestic violence courts as 
not rehabilitation oriented) indicated an incomplete success, if not a failure on the part of the 
court. From this person’s perspective, defendants in problem-solving courts are “no longer really 
defendants, they are participants” and as such are given an opportunity to prove themselves 
worthy of a less severe sentence and criminal record. If that opportunity is squandered, it is a 
fundamental disappointment of expectations for what these courts can achieve. Other 
respondents were less demanding. One focus group participant drew broad agreement when he 
described any reduction in severity or time to new arrest as an improvement: “One of the things 
we look at is if you have a kid who comes in on [first degree robbery] and he gets arrested four 
times in the next year but he gets arrested for turnstile jumping and marijuana, we consider that 
to be a huge success.” 
 
Several respondents agreed with the notion of outcomes as tied to individual change. One 
attorney noted the expectation that participants would have trouble early, making longer-term 
behavior an especially useful indicator of change. A key outcome then for these respondents is 
retention in the court – the operational theory being that the longer a participant stays in the 
problem-solving system, the greater the ultimate benefit to that person is likely to be.  
 
In addition to recidivism, respondents noted various other goals associated with individual 
change including: sobriety, educational achievement, job placement and stability, consistent 
family relationships, good healthcare, and stable housing. While many of these are difficult to 
measure, especially after participants leave problem-solving programs, there was broad 
agreement that all of these issues are squarely within the mission of problem-solving courts. 
 
Rehabilitation and the Context of Offending 
More than any other outcome, focus group participants identified measures of rehabilitation as 
critical, focusing heavily on sobriety in this regard.. One participant expressed it this way: 
 
You want more meaningful results. You want to address the problem that brought the [defendant into 
the court]. Community safety is still obviously a strong concern, but at the same time you’re trying to 
come out with a result that is more far-reaching, more long-term that  -- hopefully – by addressing the 
defendant’s issues you stop the recycling [of that person] through the courts.   
 
Some participants expressed frustration that efforts to place defendants into therapeutic services, 
especially drug treatment, were only likely to be accepted by defendants who already had 
extensive criminal records and a correspondingly long history of drug abuse and other problems:  
 
We are dealing with a dysfunctional population and they are not interested in going and getting help. 
They are interested in going and getting high. I know the defense corps has an obligation to do what 
is in the best interest of their client…It is very frustrating from a clinical point of view, from a District 
Attorney’s point of view…They have done their time in jail because the reality is that they know that 
they are going to do less jail time and get back to the streets [sooner] than they would if they went 
into a treatment program…It is only when their backs are against the wall that everybody starts 
clamoring about putting them into an alternative program.  
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Procedural Fairness 
Participants in both focus groups found problem-solving courts more oriented towards improving  
the experience of the court users. Elements of procedural fairness included: court users’ 
understanding of court proceedings; perceptions of fairness; and trust and confidence in the 
justice process. There was general agreement with one participant in New York said: “There is a 
huge benefit to society to having people go through the criminal justice system feel as if they 
have been treated fairly and given opportunities – even if they do not succeed.” Some 
participants also noted the importance of voice for both defendants and victims. For example, a 
practitioner in New York noted that many defendants might never have had positive or respectful 
interactions with officials prior to appearing in a drug court. An official from South Carolina 
spoke about the importance for victims of domestic violence to “get a sense that they’re being 
heard or that their problem is being paid attention to.” In some cases, these experiences were tied 
to the outcome of creating stronger communities, as when an attorney said, “The community 
problem-solving efforts are trying to create a sense of fairness and fitting whatever the sanction 
is with the offense instead of just handing down a sentence.”  
 
Performance Indicators for Problem-Solving Courts 
Beyond outcomes, the data from the focus groups yield a variety of characteristics that experts 
see as either unique or critical to problem-solving courts. Focus group participants and interview 
respondents were asked to consider and debate the essential qualities of problem-solving that 
could be used in determining performance in any problem-solving court. 
 
The Judge 
The role of the judge in fostering a problem-solving culture was highlighted repeatedly as an 
important feature. Respondents spoke about the authority of the judge and the leverage that a 
judge can wield to encourage compliance. Several also noted the symbolic importance of judicial 
authority for defendants, many of whom may never have had a positive experience with 
authority figures. One focus group participant put it this way: 
  
Judges interact with the accused or interact with participants and the players in the system in an 
entirely different way of talking to people. That is a very, very real distinction….When you walk in 
you start to go: Oh my god. The judge is actually looking the client in the eyes and talking to them 
like he’s a person. In traditional courts, judges try hard not to do that [because] they are trying to 
maintain their objectivity.  
 
The importance of a single judge was raised by some focus group participants, who felt that a 
single judge was more able to follow a person’s progress and to establish a meaningful rapport 
with a participant, thus encouraging compliance and, at a more human level, a desire to please 
the court. 
 
Culture 
Perhaps more than any other element of problem-solving, stakeholders agreed that the culture of 
problem-solving courts differed from traditional courts. Specifically, court actors were willing to 
move away from the deliberately impersonal or “objective” roles they traditionally maintain 
towards each other, defendants, and victims. Instead, judges, attorneys, and court staff in 
problem-solving courts embrace a vision of their professional responsibilities that allows them to 
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consider the context in which a crime takes place and the circumstances and conditions that 
contribute to criminal behavior.  
 
One of the central components of this culture is a broad awareness of treatment options. One 
focus group participant noted that in traditional courts, treatment options are largely up to 
individual court actors:  
 
You’ll have defense attorneys, the same ones, always try to facilitate a high level of justice and then 
you’ll have others who really don’t rise to the same level…So if you happen to get arrested and you 
get assigned an attorney who is very conscientious and treatment savvy, then you’re in luck. But if 
you were assigned an attorney who doesn’t care about alternative sentencing, then you are out of 
luck. You see it over and over again.  
 
Instead of using social services according to the whims and interests of individual court actors, 
problem-solving courts “standardize” the therapeutic options available to the court. As a result, 
victims and defendants may be able to access a broader array of social services. 
 
Monitoring  
Focus group participants identified several aspects of monitoring defendant compliance that were 
central to problem solving and an improvement on traditional courts. One of the most frequently 
cited elements of monitoring was the expectation that programs would accurately describe 
participant activities, progress, and compliance. One prosecutor noted that while traditional 
courts could mandate treatment programs: 
 
Nobody had ever been to that program. They don’t know if it is good or bad. If the person is 
[noncompliant] what happens? What happens after the program…Problem-solving is 
professionalizing [the use of treatment mandates]. 
 
Another prosecutor added:  
 
As Das, we’re used to people coming in and saying “I’m putting him into this program of the defense 
attorney.” And I’d say: “Fine, can you give me paperwork on the program?” And then when I’d call 
the program, it wasn’t really a program...When [the prosecutor’s office has] resources we can hire 
someone to check out these programs before we okay them. And then that sort of became ingrained 
and institutionalized in the problem-solving courtroom where we have resource coordinators [so that 
we can] assure ourselves that these programs are legitimate.  
 
In the practitioner roundtable, this ability to know and control programs was directly challenged 
by several participants, who noted that service programs were frequently difficult to assess and 
could not be relied on to deliver the services they claim to provide, especially for populations 
with special needs. 
 
Several people noted that monitoring goals varied based on the population a court is intended 
to serve. For example, one prosecutor suggested that for mental health courts working with 
severely and persistently mentally ill defendants, simply “showing up to court each week” is 
considered a “huge success.” This prosecutor went on to say that even conducting a mental 
health evaluation while a defendant is incarcerated is a success.  
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Collaborations 
There was some disagreement regarding the ultimate importance of collaboration among court 
actors. For example there was this focus group exchange between representatives from a 
prosecutor’s office and defense organization:  
 
Prosecutor: …For me successful would be putting someone in jail for a long period of time and 
somebody else would define success as treatment… 
 
Defense: You should be working that individual towards a certain goal…Success is defined as the 
agreement between the parties… 
 
Prosecutor: I don’t think there is such an agreement…I think that all of the players are at the table and 
we can open up discussion, but I might look at a defendant and say, you know what? I think there are 
real problems here. 
 
Yet those same participants also agreed:  
 
In a problem-solving court there has to be buy-in as to what the resolution of the case should be. In 
traditional court, there doesn’t need to be buy-in.  
 
While the idea of collaboration among court actors (particularly the judge, defense and 
prosecution) remains controversial, problem-solving courts also seek to promote partnerships 
outside the doors of the courthouse. Several of those interviewed suggested that early 
involvement in the court planning process was important to develop relationships between 
service providers and the court. This was both for the treatment and other services that the 
providers could offer and for the secondary role of the providers as a monitoring agent. One 
person interviewed expressed some regret that social service agencies could turn into agents of 
the court, but acknowledged, “These are partnerships that are very hard to sustain in any volume 
and problem-solving courts can facilitate them.” 
 
Court Performance 
Several administrators noted that they need to know “how the court is doing” both for internal 
purposes and to describe the court to colleagues in traditional courts, funders, and policy makers. 
One defense attorney asked, “How are these courts different? Well, for one thing traditional 
courts don’t look at how many people come back. I mean, sure, everyone has a sense of a 
‘revolving door’ but do they really know the numbers? No way.” Several court stakeholders 
expressed the importance of tracking what the court was doing but expressed concern about the 
cost of maintaining databases and systems to collect up-to-date information. A few people also 
mentioned the challenge of maintaining confidentiality in data systems shared by diverse 
stakeholders. 
 
Several people spoke about the significance of small achievements such as compliance when a 
participant had been reluctant or disengaged, or communication with estranged family members. 
One practitioner from Seattle, however, expressed some skepticism of the value of these 
indicators if recidivism does not go down: “We cannot give up on proving recidivism reduction 
because…I don’t think communities care that people are dealing with their social problems. I 
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don’t think they really care about [community service] work being done. They would rather have 
a crime-free, vibrant community.”  
 
Community 
Particularly for community courts, practitioners felt that it was important for problem-solving 
courts to demonstrate efficacy to the communities they serve. An administrator from Oregon 
voiced concern that “the neighborhood gets to see there is some accountability which serves the 
community – there is something being done.” Another person picked up the theme of 
community, noting that problem-solving courts have to work hard to make themselves seen as 
community resources because communities are hard to define and hard to incorporate, especially 
into a bureaucratic structure such as the court.   
 
Problem Solving in Traditional Courts 
A prosecutor in one of the focus groups pointed out that rehabilitation is not rejected in 
traditional courts: 
 
It’s not completely unique to problem-solving courts. You know, it is easy to go into a regular 
courtroom with a regular judge and say, Judge, I’ve got this case for the third time on a drug charge. 
My social worker got him into treatment. Here’s the program. Here’s the letter. He’s got a bed 
tomorrow: will you release him to the drug program? And the judge will almost always say yes. You 
know, it’s no different in terms of ‘let’s solve the problem’. 
 
Several participants concurred, one noting, “It’s always the stories that are important, and many 
judges recognize that [it is important to understand] defendant needs.” However, there remained 
concern that traditional courts lack the resources needed to monitor any mandate for drug 
treatment, community service, or other alternative sanctions. Several respondents were skeptical 
that courts without the resources available to problem-solving courts would succeed at keeping 
track of defendants. But one prosecutor noted that many service programs were willing to take 
on monitoring functions to maintain a court-based caseload.  
 
Another participant pointed out that the culture of problem-solving courts accepts setbacks in 
treatment, whereas a judge in a traditional court is more likely to impose the alternative custodial 
sentence after a single infraction. By implication, for problem solving to be effective outside the 
specialized problem-solving court context, some aspects of the court culture of problem-solving 
courts would have to be disseminated more broadly to general calendar judges. 
 
Some focus group participants, notably prosecutors, did not see a role for problem solving 
(whether inside or outside a specialized court) after cases crossed an undefined level of severity. 
One participant used the example of rape:  
 
Say we have a sex offense part, every sex offense is going into that part. They might be very 
different. I may have somebody who flashes somebody versus someone who pulls out a knife or a 
gun and rapes a woman coming off a train when she’s coming home. As a prosecutor, those are two 
very different cases for me, but I am in front of the same court. The second [scenario] there is no 
treatment for that guy, I am going to insist on a jail sentence. The first one I might be open to it, you 
know, I mean, you know, a gunpoint rape and that guy is going to jail.  
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As this example makes clear, for some court actors problem-solving implies alternative non-
custodial sanctions which may be viewed as inappropriate for some cases. 
 
At the same time, other experts were interested in exploring what the problem-solving model 
could offer to general calendar courts trying very serious offenses. One person mused: “Problem-
solving is a lens to use when you look at a case. What can it offer to murder cases? This is the 
hardest thing to operationalize, but the broad view of analyzing the context of the crime is central 
to problem-solving.”  
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Chapter 5 
Universal Performance Indicators for Problem-Solving Courts 
 
 
This chapter describes a set of universal problem-solving court performance indicators for use by 
practitioners and researchers alike. The indicators, which were developed by examining and 
categorizing findings from both the literature on problem-solving courts and focus groups and 
interviews conducted for this project, are intended for all problem-solving courts. In practice, 
however, they may not apply evenly to all models (e.g., drug vs. domestic violence courts). 
Indicators whose significance is limited primarily to one model are reserved for Chapter 6, where 
we present separate additions for drug, mental health, domestic violence, and community courts. 
Chapter 7 then proposes a brief list of indicators for conventional courts that wish to document 
their problem-solving activity. 
 
In developing the performance indicators, we focused on those that practicable. Many measures 
are dichotomous (either yes or no), can be collected quarterly or annually, and are intended to 
make data collection as easy as possible. The indicators fall into three organizing principles that 
appeared to elicit broad agreement in the previous literature and project focus groups.  
1. Problem-solving orientation (Table 5.1) 
2. Collaboration (Table 5.2) 
3. Accountability (Table 5.3) 
 
Reading the Tables 
For each organizing principle, a summary table lists the applicable problem-solving court goals, 
objectives, indicators, and sources in the previous literature (Chapter 3) or focus groups or 
interviews (Chapter 4). The meaning of each key term is as follows: 
 
• Goal: One of the defining purposes of a problem-solving court.  
 
• Court Objective: Specific activities necessary to achieve the broader goal. Objectives 
should be sufficiently specific, concrete, and quantifiable to lead directly into the 
identification of one or more appropriate performance indicators.  
 
• Performance Indicator: A discrete, specific, and quantifiable measure of progress towards 
the specified objective. If the objective has been met, the indicator(s) will be favorable.  
 
• Unit of Analysis: The exact method for measuring the specified performance indicator 
(e.g., how many people did X, what percentage of cases did Y). The unit of analysis 
virtually always involves a number, percentage, or an answer to a yes/no question about 
whether a given activity took place. 
 
• Source and Concept: Key citations where the given objective or indicators were 
previously introduced or (in many cases) implied but not formalized. Wherever the 
applicable citation is to Chapter 4 of this report, it is represented as “CCI 2010.” 
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• Notes and Caveats: In the rightmost column, the tables indicate whether any important 
caveats apply to an indicator’s use. Such caveats typically concern the indicator’s 
applicability to one of the core problem-solving court models. For instance, because 
many domestic violence courts do not focus on the goal of offender rehabilitation, several 
of the indicators may have more limited application in a domestic violence court context. 
 
To make it as easy as possible to collect data on the indicators, many complex dynamics have 
been distilled to simple yes/no indicators (e.g., whether the court conducts a 
screening/assessment, engages in judicial status hearings, or has dedicated staff). This 
simplification may sacrifice important detail and nuance, frequently reducing complex 
qualitative questions to quantitative measures. If courts have the resources to conduct more 
nuanced data collection on indicators of success, they should certainly expand the indicators that 
are displayed in the tables. 
 
To avoid redundancy, each table only includes unique indicators. To suggest possible cross-
referencing, symbols are used where the indicator first appears. They are: □ to indicate a possible 
cross-reference to problem-solving orientation; ○ cross-reference to collaboration; and ● cross-
reference to accountability.  
 
The tables generally refer to defendants and other litigants as “participants/litigants.” The term 
“defendants” would have omitted civil problem-solving courts, and the term “participant” by 
itself is inappropriate for some models, notably domestic violence or sex offense courts. 
 
Problem-Solving Orientation (see Table 5.1) 
The concept of a problem-solving orientation points to similar features as several other concepts 
in the literature, including problem-solving culture, outcome orientation, and individualized 
justice. The concept indicates a focus on solving the problems that precipitated justice 
involvement by addressing the underlying needs of litigants, victims, or the broader community. 
In some cases the concept implies an interest in rehabilitation through individualized 
assessments, services, and treatment plans. Such an interest, however, may be less applicable to 
domestic violence or community courts, where the defining “problems” are less the psychosocial 
issues of the presenting litigant as the impact of anti-social behavior on the victims of crime, a 
particular community, or the larger society. 
 
As shown in table 5.1, a problem-solving orientation entails five distinct goals:  
1. Individualized screening and problem assessment 
2. Individualized treatment mandate 
3. Direct engagement of participant 
4. Focus on outcomes 
5. System change 
 
Goal 1: Individualized Screening and Problem Assessment 
Early identification and assessment incorporates the traditional goal of speedy case processing, 
along with the problem-solving goal of understanding the full nature of each litigant’s individual 
situation, including the underlying issues that led to justice involvement. An expedient court 
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screen (e.g., based on charges, criminal history, and willingness to participate) can be used to 
limit more time-consuming assessment activities only to those who are “paper eligible” for court 
entry. For those who are deemed viable candidates, a standardized assessment tool can be used to 
determine specific litigant needs. 
 
a. Potential participants/litigants are screened and assessed: After the initial screen (for paper 
eligibility), the more detailed assessment typically examines drug use and criminal history, 
physical and mental health, educational and vocational attainment, and family history. Preferably, 
the courts will use tools that have been empirically validated for their ability to detect both the 
prevalence and severity of psychosocial needs – e.g., both whether the litigant is addicted to 
drugs (prevalence) and, if so, how serious is the addiction and what is the most appropriate 
treatment plan (severity). CAVEATS: Staff at many domestic violence courts may deem 
individualized assessments of defendants as unnecessary or possibly inappropriate, particularly if 
the court prioritizes offender accountability over offender rehabilitation. Assessment practices 
may also be limited in some community courts that emphasize restitution due to constraints in 
leverage and jurisdiction that dictate relatively limited sanctions (e.g., community service 
mandates) over rehabilitation (e.g., social services).  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: To determine basic performance, track the following simple measures: 
Does the court use screening (yes/no) and assessment instruments (yes/no) to determine 
eligibility and/or individual needs? Does the court use a validated assessment tool (yes/no)? 
How many people are screened per year? Of those screened, how many are found eligible 
and ineligible and how many in fact enter the court? 
 
b. Early identification through coordination with courthouse staff: One tenet of problem-solving 
courts is to use the crisis moment of an arrest/case filing as an opportunity to motivate the litigant 
to participate in therapeutic interventions. Efficient screening requires trained courthouse staff to 
review every incoming case and refer eligible ones (based on charge and criminal history criteria) 
to the problem-solving court. Even after charge eligibility is determined, the more nuanced and 
time-consuming work of clinical assessment should still proceed as rapidly as possible. CAVEATS: 
The potential for speedy identification and placement may be limited where problem-solving 
court does not meet daily or where community-based treatment resources are limited. 
Additionally, since domestic violence court involvement is typically mandatory once it has been 
determined that a case is charge-eligible, this objective is inapplicable to that model.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: Track the number of days from arrest/case filing to formal problem-
solving court enrollment. Court stakeholders should set locally appropriate benchmarks (i.e., 
how many days is acceptable), given that it is not feasible for all courts to achieve the same 
average performance. 
 
Goal 2: Individualized Treatment or Service Mandate 
A problem-solving orientation generally presumes that litigant needs vary. Accordingly, the goal 
of individualized mandates allows problem-solving courts to respond to the problems of each 
individual participant/litigant. CAVEATS (to all three objectives): Domestic violence and 
community courts typically link defendants with programs, but those courts sometimes focus less 
on crafting highly individualized treatment plans or making available a wide range of treatment 
modalities than on achieving offender accountability, victim services, or community restitution. 
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a. Court links participants to appropriate services: Linkage with community-based services and 
programs is a universal tenet of problem-solving justice. The tenet recognizes that the court is 
frequently well positioned to provide service referrals, because litigants are often unconnected 
when they first arrive in court, unwilling to accept services without a court mandate or both.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: Track the total number and percentage of all participants/litigants who 
are linked to each general type of service or alternative sanction: e.g., community service, 
substance abuse treatment, mental health treatment, batterer program, GED class, 
employment program, life skills class, health education class, etc. 
 
b. Court uses continuum of treatment modalities: A continuum of services must be available to 
respond to the variety and degrees of need that participants/litigants present. For example, a court 
that assigns participants to substance abuse treatment will want to have available long-term 
residential treatment, short-term rehabilitation (typically 30 days), and a continuum of outpatient 
modalities.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: Track the number of available treatment and service modalities and track 
the number of providers, overall and for each modality. 
 
c. Court revisits treatment or service plan based on progress: A problem-solving orientation comes 
with recognition that it may take some participants a few tries before they can find the services 
that can best address their problems. Therefore, the judge should use clinical updates to 
reevaluate past decisions. The availability of clear, regular progress reports signals whether the 
judge has the information necessary to do this. The ability to revisit treatment plans is especially 
valuable in cases of drug addiction and mental illness, where participants often require more or 
less supervision than was initially assessed; and where relapse to drug use (or non-compliance 
with medication) may require an intensification to help participants avoid failure.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: Confirm whether the court obtains regular clinical updates through a 
simple dichotomous measure (yes/no); track whether or not the court uses such updates to 
determine appropriate mandates, potentially altering the treatment plan when necessary 
(yes/no); and track the percentage of participants that are in fact reassigned from one 
modality to another during their participation. 
 
Goal 3: Direct Engagement of the Participant 
In speaking directly to participants, the judge seeks to become more directly engaged in 
producing positive change; and acknowledges that the problem-solving process depends on 
participants’ perception that they were heard and that the process was fair. The goal of direct 
engagement implies two objectives:  
 
a. Judge engages in direct interaction with participant: First, and counter to convention, the judge 
should directly address and engage with the participant/litigant at regular (i.e., frequent) judicial 
status hearings.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: Measure direct engagement with a simple dichotomous affirmation 
(yes/no); and record the average number of required status hearings (e.g., per month). 
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b. Judge explains responsibilities and decisions to participant: The judge should personally confirm 
that the participant understands the court mandate and should regularly reaffirm that 
understanding. This indicator (again measured dichotomously, yes/no) establishes that 
participants remain engaged and informed concerning court expectations, increasing the 
likelihood of compliance (Young and Belenko 2002). In addition, the indicator demonstrates that 
the judge is willing to translate legal jargon into plain English as needed to establish 
understanding – a key element of procedural justice (e.g., per Tyler 1990; Frazer 2006).  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: Check-off whether the judge initially provides (yes/no) and consistently 
reiterates a clear, non-technical explanation of key responsibilities (yes/no). 
 
c. Court staff engage in direct interaction with participant: All staff in the court (with the possible 
exception of prosecutors) may directly interact with participants/litigants to provide consistent 
support and generate a culture of respect within the courtroom. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: Measure direct engagement with a simple dichotomous affirmation 
(yes/no). 
 
 Goal 4: Focus on Outcomes 
A problem-solving orientation requires a fundamental expansion of the judicial role beyond 
adjudicating cases and rendering legally appropriate decisions to a focus on the outcomes 
achieved through court intervention (see Hora et al. 1999). In most problem-solving courts, these 
outcomes involve addressing the underlying problems of participants/litigants, but some models 
(especially domestic violence and community courts) also seek to produce positive outcomes for 
crime victims and local communities. Performance indicators that target victim and community 
level outcomes are reserved for Chapter 6. 
 
a. Court retains participants in the program: To measure program retention, adult drug courts 
generally use a one-year retention rate. It is the percentage of participants who have graduated or 
are still actively participating one year after entry (see Belenko 1998; Heck 2006; Rempel 2005a; 
Rubio et al. 2008). Participants who have failed as of the one-year mark, or have disappeared 
from program contact, are considered not retained. For community courts and misdemeanor drug 
courts that employ shorter mandates, a shorter retention period may be identified (90 days, six 
months). Other key indicators include the time in the program for those who respectively 
complete and dropout; and the completion rate, preferably tracking variance over time – i.e., to 
test whether completion rates increase as the program refines its policies and gains experience.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: Track the court’s one-year retention rate (or its retention rate over other 
appropriate periods, e.g., 90 days, six months, 18 months, two years); and track the court’s 
completion rate. To determine the typical program dosage, track the average number of 
months of participation, separately for program completers and dropouts. 
 
b. Court focuses on behavior changes beyond program completion: The following indicators must 
include all participants who initially enroll. Tracking graduates only or comparing graduates to 
failures is uninformative, since people who comply with a program by graduating will generally 
be predisposed to comply in other ways as well (e.g., by not re-offending). Recidivism, as 
measured by re-arrest (or re-conviction) is analyzed at intervals, such as during program or 6, 12, 
or 24 months after completion. Additional nuance can be provided by examining the severity 
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(e.g., felony vs. misdemeanor) or type (e.g., drug vs. property-related) of re-offending. While 
more difficult to track, outcomes such as drug use, family contact, and employment all indicate 
long-term impact. To rigorously measure impact, it is necessary to employ a comparison group, 
composed of similar individuals who did not have the opportunity to participate, for one reason 
or another (see Rempel 2005a). CAVEATS: Staff at many courts may be practicably unable to 
identify a comparison group. For this reason, staff may prefer to focus primarily on tracking 
program retention and completion (Objective a) and comparing retention and completion rates to 
other similar programs. Alternatively, court staff may wish to invest in a formal evaluation by a 
trained independent evaluator that would include a rigorously constructed comparison group. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: Track re-arrest rates (and other psychosocial outcomes if possible) for 
court participants and, ideally, an appropriate comparison group. CAVEAT: As noted above, 
ongoing tracking may be unfeasible for courts with limited evaluation resources; two 
alternatives are to limit tracking to retention rates (Objective A) or to conduct a one-time 
only formal evaluation (rather than continue track these outcomes on an ongoing basis). 
 
Goal 5: System Change 
While problem-solving courts typically seek to address the problems of individual victims and 
defendants they also seek a broader impact, both within the justice system and in the broader 
community. Two objectives capture this goal of cultural change: 
 
a. Stakeholders learn about the underlying causes of justice involvement: Most problem-solving 
courts should educate key players about the nature of relevant health and behavioral problems, 
such as drug abuse, mental illness, and domestic violence. Indeed, it is an explicit goal of many 
domestic violence courts to change attitudes about domestic violence. Education may involve 
formal trainings, brown bag sessions, or site visits, but all courts should devote resources to 
improving the knowledge of the local judiciary, attorneys, and court staff.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: To make data collection easy, simple dichotomous indications of 
whether key team members have attended any formal training is a good start (e.g., yes/no for 
judge, prosecutor, and defense representative). Where possible, such indicators can be 
enhanced by noting the type(s) of trainings, the number of participants attending each one, 
and the frequency of trainings. 
 
b. Problem-solving courts seek to affect the most cases they can in a jurisdiction: One of the 
consistent critiques of problem-solving courts has been that they serve as “boutiques” and are 
unable to affect significant numbers of cases in a jurisdiction (see Bhati et al. 2007). In order to 
produce truly systemic change, these courts must be able to demonstrate significant impact in 
terms of numbers or the percentages of cases handled within a jurisdiction.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: Although ideal, estimating the total number of eligible cases in a 
jurisdiction may be unfeasible. However, a minimum effort should involve regularly tracking 
the number of people (1) screened, (2) found eligible, and (3) participating in each problem-
solving court (e.g., on a per year basis; or perhaps quarterly or monthly where feasible). 
Court staff should strive to maximize these numbers to ensure a systemic impact in the 
courthouse and, ultimately, in the affected communities. 
 
 
 Table 5.1  
PROBLEM-SOLVING ORIENTATION 
 
Court Objective  Performance Indicator  Unit of Analysis Source and Concept* Notes and 
Caveats  
 
Goal 1: Individualized Screening and Problem Assessment 
 
a. Potential 
participants/litigants 
are screened and 
assessed ○ 
• Court administers psychosocial 
screening or assessment prior to 
finalizing entry  
• Court uses validated screening 
or assessment tool 
Administers screening 
or assessment (Y/N); 
Uses validated tool 
(Y/N); Number of 
people screened, 
assessed and found 
eligible or rejected 
DCPO (1997) identified 
as Rapid identification; 
NCSC (2003) as Early 
intervention; and CCI 
(2007) as Individualized 
justice; and CCI (2010) 
Not all tools have 
been formally 
validated through 
research.  
b. Early 
identification 
through 
coordination with 
courthouse staff ○ 
• Time from arrest/case filing to 
entry in problem-solving court 
Number of days DCPO (1997) identified 
as Rapid identification; 
and NCSC (2003)  
identified as Early 
intervention 
(1) In mental 
health courts, early 
identification may 
not be a priority. 
(2) Different time 
markers may apply 
to juvenile courts. 
 
Goal 2: Individualized Treatment or Service Mandate 
 
a. Court links 
participants/litigants 
to appropriate 
services ○ 
• Number and percent of 
participants/litigants linked 
to each type of service or 
program (e.g., community 
service, drug treatment, 
mental health treatment, 
batterer program, GED class, 
parenting class, etc.)  
Number and percent of 
participants/litigants 
assigned to each service 
type 
Rand (2001) identified 
as Rehabilitation and 
Program Intensity; 
DCPO (1997) as 
Continuum of treatment; 
CCI (2001) as 
Outcomes; and CCI 
(2010). 
Besides offenders, 
domestic violence 
courts also link 
victims with 
services (and may 
consider doing the 
latter to be more 
important) 
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Court Objective Performance Indicator  Unit of Analysis 
 
Source and Concept* Notes and 
Caveats 
b. Court uses 
continuum of 
treatment modalities 
and services ○  
• Number of treatment 
modalities and services 
• Number of providers per 
modality or service type 
• New services are developed 
as needed 
Number of modalities 
overall; Number of 
service types; Providers 
identify service gaps 
(Yes/No); Providers have 
ever added services 
(Yes/No)  
DCPO (1997) identified 
as Continuum of 
treatment and 
Community 
partnerships; RAND 
(2001) as Program 
intensity; CCI (2001) as 
Collaboration 
(1) The need for a 
continuum of 
modalities may 
apply less to 
domestic violence 
and community 
courts. (2) Some 
providers may 
offer multiple 
services/modalities 
c. Court revisits 
treatment plan/ 
mandate based on 
progress/compliance 
○ 
• Clinical indicators of 
progress used to determine 
case movement 
• Participants can be 
reassigned to different 
modalities or services based 
on need 
Court uses clinical 
indicators of progress 
(Yes/No); 
participants/litigants can 
be reassigned (Yes/No) 
DCPO (1997) identified 
as Treatment integrated 
with court process; 
NCSC (2003) as 
Integrated Social 
Services and 
Monitoring;  Rand 
(2001) as Program 
Intensity; and CCI 
(2007) as Outcomes 
Revisiting 
“treatment” plans 
may apply less to 
domestic violence 
courts (where 
addressing clinical 
issues may be less 
important) and to 
community courts 
(whose initial 
mandates may be 
extremely short).  
 
Goal 3: Direct Engagement of Participant/Litigant  
 
a. Judge engages in 
direct interaction 
with 
participants/litigants 
• Regular  judicial compliance 
hearings 
• Judge directly converses 
with participants/litigants 
about behavioral progress 
Average number status 
hearings/month; Judge 
directly converses 
(Yes/No) 
DCPO (1997) identified 
as Judicial Interaction; 
and CCI (2001) as 
Judicial authority 
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Court Objective  Performance Indicator  Unit of Analysis Source and Concept* Notes and 
Caveats 
b. Judge explains 
responsibilities and 
decisions to 
participants/litigants 
● 
• Judge explains mandates and 
decisions in plain language 
• Judge reiterates 
responsibilities at each status 
hearing 
Judge explains in plain 
language (Yes/No); and 
reiterates responsibilities 
(Yes/No) 
DCPO (1997) identified 
as Judicial Interaction; 
and CCI (2001) as 
Judicial authority 
 
c. Court staff and 
attorneys engage 
with 
participants/litigants 
●○ 
• Staff  address and respond to  
participants/litigants 
• Staff reiterate court mandate, 
goals and purpose 
Job responsibilities 
include direct interaction 
with participant/litigant 
(Yes/No) 
CCI (2001) identified as 
Non-traditional roles 
Prosecutors are not 
expected to interact 
with 
participant/litigant 
 
Goal 4: Focus on Outcomes 
 
a. Court retains 
participants/litigants 
in program ● 
• Completion rate 
• One year (or other appropriate) 
retention rate 
• Total time in program (for both 
graduates and failures) 
 
Percent graduated, still 
active, failed at one 
year; Average days 
from enrollment to 
discharge/completion; 
graduates/(graduates + 
failures) 
CCI (2001) identified as 
Case outcomes; and CCI 
(2009) 
Retention rate 
should correspond 
with anticipated 
length of court 
participation (e.g., 
much shorter than 
one year in 
community courts) 
b. Court focuses on 
behavior changes 
beyond case 
completion ● 
• Recidivism rate during program 
and/or at 6, 12, 24 and 36 
months after program exit, 
ideally compared with similar 
offenders not involved in 
problem-solving court** 
Re-arrested or re-
convicted (Yes/No) for  
court 
participants/litigants 
and comparison group; 
Yes/No for different 
levels of re-offending 
(felony, misdemeanor) 
CCI (2001) identified as 
Case outcomes; Rand 
(2001) identified as 
Rehabilitation; and CCI 
(2009) 
(2) Either arrest or 
conviction data can 
be used, but the 
chosen measure 
should be used 
consistently.  
(2) For civil cases, 
measure violations 
or modifications. 
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Court Objective  Performance Indicator  Unit of Analysis Source and Concept* Notes and 
Caveats 
 
Goal 5: System Change 
 
a. Stakeholders 
learn about context 
of justice 
involvement ○  
• Court stakeholders and team 
members have formal training 
in relevant social issues (drug 
addiction for drug courts, 
domestic violence for domestic 
violence courts, etc.) 
Yes/No for dedicated 
judge and attorney 
representatives (e.g., 
prosecutor and defense 
in a criminal context), 
preferably 
distinguished by 
problem area (drug 
addiction, mental 
illness, domestic 
violence, sex 
offending, juvenile 
delinquency, etc.) 
CCI (2001) identified as 
Non-traditional roles; 
DCPO (1997) as 
Interdisciplinary 
Education 
 
b. Court reaches 
sizable population 
(relative to size of 
the eligible target 
population) 
• People screened for court entry 
• People accepted into court 
Number 
screened/Number 
eligible; Number 
participating  
Concern introduced 
within project focus 
groups and expert 
interviews (CCI 2010) 
Financial 
constraints on 
serving a large 
volume of cases 
may be noted, but 
such constraints do 
not obviate the 
goal of system 
change or need to 
track court reach. 
* In all tables, the “source and concept” column references literature cited in Chapter 3 by organization and year, and refers to findings from the focus groups and 
interviews conducted as part of this project, and presented in Chapter 4 of this report, as CCI (2009). 
** Additional indicators can include employment, housing stability, family contact, and substance use. 
○Cross-reference to Collaboration ●Cross-reference to Accountability
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Collaboration (see Table 5.2) 
From planning to start-up, today’s problem-solving courts routinely seek interdisciplinary 
collaboration with players both internal and external to the justice system. For this reason, the 
California court system refers to problem-solving courts instead as “collaborative justice courts.” 
In theory, collaboration enables the court to generate greater shared knowledge about the causes 
and impacts of justice involvement; to share information and discuss unique features of each 
participant’s case; to plan court mandates and identify appropriate therapeutic interventions; and 
to monitor participant compliance.  
 
Importantly, collaboration as intended here does not require teamwork or the notion of a “non-
adversarial process” (e.g., as described in DCPO 1997). Even domestic violence courts and 
community courts, which typically maintain an adversarial process within the courtroom, 
routinely promote a dynamic of collaboration through planning meetings and outreach to 
community-based service providers and advocacy groups (e.g., see Henry and Kralstein 2010; 
Labriola et al. 2009; Newmark et al. 2001). 
 
To avoid repetition, table 5.2 only presents performance indicators that are unique to 
collaboration. As conceived, collaboration entails four distinct goals:  
1. Justice System Collaboration 
2. Social Service Provider Collaboration 
3. Community Collaboration 
4. Participant Collaboration (discussed elsewhere: Table 5.1, Goal 3; Table 5.3, Goal 1) 
 
Goal 1: Justice System Collaboration 
One of the early defining characteristics of drug courts was the willingness of judges, attorneys, 
probation, and others to work together to develop court policies and resolve individual cases. 
This kind of collaboration often led to the development of shared definitions of court success, 
including the goal of reduced recidivism. Two simple measures for such collaboration are 
whether multiple justice players (e.g., judge, attorneys, courthouse administrators, probation, law 
enforcement) participated in court planning; and whether dedicated staff has been assigned to the 
problem-solving court. Other features such as a reduction in adversarial communication (e.g., see 
especially DCPO 1997) are more difficult to measure. In this respect, court staff may be able to 
simply check-off (yes/no) whether the structure of judicial status hearings – typically held after a 
plea has been taken – necessarily entails an easing in the normal adversarial process. Such an 
easing might be conceptualized as occurring if prosecutors do not routinely speak at every 
hearing and/or if the judge interacts directly with participants (not through their attorneys). 
CAVEATS: Achieving a reduction in the adversarial process was first proposed for drug courts 
(DCPO 1997), but this particular indicator does not generally apply to domestic violence courts. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: Confirm whether the problem-solving court has a dedicated judge, 
prosecutor, and defense attorney (or other type of dedicated attorney in a civil context). 
Check-off whether the structure of judicial status hearings entails less adversarial 
communication than in a traditional court hearing (e.g., as when the judge interacts directly 
with participants rather than through the attorneys throughout the court appearance (yes/no; 
omit this indicator for domestic violence courts). 
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Goal 2: Social Service Provider Collaboration 
 
External collaboration involves actors from the justice system working in partnership with other 
public agencies, social service providers, and community representatives. Service providers offer 
the crucial treatment and other programmatic interventions that are intended to monitor or 
change participant/litigant behavior. Courts that successfully incorporate service providers will 
consult with clinical experts to develop appropriate progress markers and will use those markers 
to assess the appropriateness of court mandates. The court will also need to balance clinical with 
legal considerations, such as the amount of participation in services it is legally appropriate to 
require, given the severity of the underlying offense. Such considerations may pose a particular 
problem for community courts, where the interventions must be short (because the underlying 
offenses tend to be low-level), even if they are unlikely to be efficacious without a longer 
duration. All of these issues benefit from collaborative discussion among justice and service 
provider representatives, as seen in the following two objectives: 
 
a. Court and service providers collaborate to offer services and assess participant progress: When 
developing court mandates, judges and other justice actors will benefit to the extent that they are 
willing to learn from local providers about the clinical implications of participant behavior and 
the likely timing and dynamics of recovery. Once court policies have been established, justice 
and community-based partners will need to exchange information regularly regarding participant 
behavior – i.e., just prior to each judicial status hearing. The information from outside agencies 
permits the problem-solving court to acknowledge progress, sanction noncompliance, and 
appropriately adjust mandates as needed. Importantly, in a domestic violence court context, 
progress reports may focus primarily on compliance (e.g., did participants attend services as 
ordered and demonstrate a proper demeanor), whereas in more rehabilitative models, the reports 
may expand on clinical considerations.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: Track whether community-based service providers and supervision 
agencies are included in court planning (yes/no); whether providers are informed about 
scheduled status hearings (yes/no); and whether providers deliver progress reports to the 
court before each hearing (yes/no). 
 
b. Court and service providers both participate in case review meetings: Service providers will 
maintain their own rules of conduct for their clients as well as their own sanctions for rule 
violations. To work with a problem-solving court, providers must communicate these procedures 
and resolve any conflict between them and the rules of the court. While more challenging, the 
same holds true with departments of probation and parole. This is easiest if providers are 
included in planning the court (see Objective A). Once the court opens, regular meetings can 
serve to identify problem cases, ensure that all stakeholders understand court policies, and 
provide a forum for refining policies based on experience.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: Track whether case review meetings occur (yes/no). If they do, track 
how often (number of times per week, month, or year); whether each of several key roles is 
represented (yes/no: judge, prosecutor, defense, probation, and service provider(s)); and 
whether the meetings involve actual decisions on the cases that are discussed (e.g., phase 
promotion will be granted; sanction will be imposed, etc.). 
 
 
 Chapter 5. Performance Indicators for Problem-Solving Courts Page 39
Goal 3: Community Collaboration 
In one way or another problem-solving courts seek to address the community impact of 
offending and to increase public confidence in justice. Problem-solving courts can demonstrate 
community involvement through contact with local residents and community-based 
organizations and participation in community events. In regular concrete community and court 
user input regarding appropriate court focus and policies. Effective and legally appropriate 
community outreach is difficult to quantify and may be limited for models other than community 
courts. (Thus, indicators pertaining to community collaboration are expanded in the section of 
Chapter 6 that focuses on community courts.) The recommendations below incorporate several 
simple measures to determine the extent to which community outreach is attempted at all.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: Track the number of community appearances (e.g., per year) by court 
staff and the number of visits to the court by community stakeholders. In addition, document 
the number of court solicitations of community or court user input (e.g., through meetings of 
a community advisory board, neighborhood or user satisfaction surveys, or other 
mechanisms). 
 
 
 
 
 
Dichotomous Data: Coming to YES or NO 
 
Many of the performance indicators suggested in this chapter ask for dichotomous 
responses: Yes, the indicator does happen, or No, it does not. There are two reasons to 
use simple responses like this. First, it is the easiest data to collect. Second, it provides 
clear information that can highlight both achievements and challenges. To collect 
dichotomous information, it is important that the questions to be answered “yes” or 
“no” are clear and unambiguous. For example, to assess whether a problem-solving 
court increases substantive understanding of domestic violence in a jurisdiction, we 
recommend tracking whether the judge and key attorneys have attended a formal 
training. The indicator would be, “Do staff receive training on domestic violence?” A 
“Yes” or “No” answer should be determined by assessing whether the training content 
indeed addresses domestic violence and whether the relevant staff members attend. 
Additional data to enrich the Yes or No response could assess whether the training is 
repeated when new staff are assigned; whether it has any discernible impact on 
courtroom decision-making and the extent to which staff appear to have learned or 
retained any of the information the training is intended to deliver.  
  
In other dichotomous responses, such as whether the judge explains the consequences 
of infractions, there is perhaps still an element of subjectivity in rendering the required 
yes/no determination. With such measures, a simple courtroom observation session, or 
even reflection about whether the given policy (explaining consequences) happens 
automatically as a matter of course, can facilitate an appropriate yes/no response.  
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Table 5.2 
COLLABORATION 
 
Court Objective  Performance Indicator  Unit of 
Analysis 
Source and Concept Notes and Caveats 
 
Goal 1: Justice System Collaboration 
 
a. Justice stakeholders 
collaborate on court 
policies and case-level 
decisions □ 
• Attorneys, supervision 
agencies, judiciary and 
other stakeholders involved 
in court planning 
• Dedicated attorneys and 
dedicated judge 
• Less adversarial 
communication in 
courtroom 
Yes/No for 
each group of 
stakeholders; 
Yes/No for 
reduction in 
adversarial 
communication 
DCPO(1997) identified as Non-
adversarial; CCI (2001) as 
System change; and Non-
traditional roles and (2007) as 
Collaboration; NCSC (2003) as 
Alternative sanction 
(1) All courts are 
expected to 
maintain due 
process. (2) 
Domestic violence 
courts typically 
retain adversarial 
courtroom 
communication  
(making the third 
bulleted indicator 
inapplicable).  
 
Goal 2: Social Service Provider Collaboration 
 
a. Court and service 
providers collaborate to 
offer services and 
assess 
participant/litigant 
progress/compliance ● 
 
• Service providers and 
supervision agencies (e.g., 
probation) included in 
court planning 
• Service providers and 
supervision agencies 
informed about case 
hearings 
• Clinical case reports 
routinely delivered to court 
Yes/No DCPO (1997) identified as 
Treatment integrated with court 
process and Coordinated 
response; NCSC (2003) as 
Integrated Social Services and 
Monitoring; Rand (2001) as 
Rehabilitation and Leverage; 
CCI (2001) as Collaboration; 
and CCI (2007) as Outcomes 
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Court Objective  Performance Indicator  Unit of 
Analysis 
Source and Concept Notes and Caveats 
b. Court and service 
providers both 
participate in case 
review meetings ● 
• Case review meetings 
regularly held  
• Case review meetings 
include central stakeholders 
• Case review meetings 
result in decision-making 
for each case discussed 
 
Yes/No and 
number of 
meetings/month 
or year; Yes/No 
for each 
stakeholder; 
Yes/No for 
decisions made 
DCPO (1997) identified as 
Treatment integrated with court 
process and Coordinated 
response; NCSC (2003) as 
Integrated Social Services and 
Monitoring;  Rand (2001) as 
Rehabilitation and Leverage; 
CCI (2001) as Collaboration 
In some courts, 
such as community 
courts, not all 
participants may be 
mandated to 
services; thus, case 
review meetings 
may be limited in 
focus to a smaller 
subset of the 
court’s caseload.  
 
Goal 3: Community Collaboration 
 
a. Court and 
community are 
mutually responsive ● 
• Community stakeholders 
involved in court 
planning 
• Attendance by court staff 
at community events and 
meetings 
• Visits to court by 
community stakeholders 
• Court solicits input from 
community, including 
litigants, victims and 
family members 
Number of 
stakeholders from 
community 
involved in 
planning; Number 
of contacts (per 
year); Number of 
meetings, surveys, 
or other formal 
solicitations of 
community or 
court user input 
(per year) 
DCPO (1997) identified as 
Community Partnerships; and 
CCI (2001) as Collaboration  
and Non-traditional roles 
Some courts may 
not involve 
community 
stakeholders 
directly, e.g. some 
felony courts may 
limit community 
outreach to service 
providers and 
others directly 
affiliated with the 
court. 
● Cross-reference with Accountability □Cross-reference with Problem-Solving Orientation
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Accountability (see Table 5.3) 
In its most common usage among problem-solving court practitioners, the concept of 
accountability refers to the responsibility of court participants/litigants to comply with their 
mandates or face additional penalties, up to and including incarceration. However, the literature 
review and project focus groups identified two other uses that are also outlined below. They 
respectively concern the accountability of social service providers to deliver the services they 
have claimed to provide and the accountability of the court itself to collect appropriate self-
assessment data and to take responsibility for monitoring its performance.  
 
Table 5.3 highlights performance indicators related to accountability. Indicators that were 
already introduced are not repeated below. The general goals associated with accountability are: 
 
1. Offender Accountability 
2. Service Provider Accountability 
3. Court Accountability 
 
Goal 1: Offender Accountability 
Problem-solving courts seek to hold participating offenders – and other litigants – accountable 
for their criminal behavior and for complying with court mandates. To comply, the offenders 
must understand their obligations (see Frazer 2006; Tyler 1990) and have a clear incentive to 
comply (e.g., threat of jail, see Rempel and DeStefano 2001; Young and Belenko 2002). For its 
part, the court must monitor and respond to compliance and noncompliance as it happens (see 
Labriola et al. 2007; Marlowe and Kirby 1999). Typically, problem-solving courts ensure their 
ability to respond to participant/litigant behavior by maintaining updated information; holding 
regular judicial status hearings; and using concrete sanctions (and perhaps incentives) in 
response to specific behaviors. Some models add other tools, such as drug testing; required case 
management meetings; and monitoring compliance with orders of protection.  
 
The goal of offender accountability has five objectives. They are (a) to monitor participant 
progress; (b) to maintain practical incentives for participants to comply; (c) to ensure that 
participants understand and expect specific court penalties and incentives; (d) to ensure that 
participants expect the court to impose a promised sentence; and (e) to ensure that participants 
expect sanctions and incentives to match behavior. These objectives can be divided into two 
categories: monitoring (objective A) and participant understanding and expectation (all the rest). 
 
a. Participant/litigant progress monitored: Problem-solving courts engage in specific forms of 
monitoring, typically judicial status hearings, case management meetings, and drug testing (the 
latter in only some models). Of these, judicial status hearings are perhaps the most universal. 
Simply measuring whether status hearings occur, their frequency, and whether judges directly 
address participants, will indicate achievement of this objective. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: Track whether court participants attend judicial status hearings (and if 
so, how often) as well as ongoing case management or probation supervision meetings (and if 
so, how often). Measures described above under “direct engagement of the participant” also 
apply (see Problem-Solving Orientation, Goal 3). 
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b. Participants/litigants have practical incentive to complete court mandates: For many problem-
solving courts, a classic incentive to comply is a custodial sentence if the participant fails. If the 
sentence is long enough to be perceived as burdensome, the court has “leverage” over the 
participant to complete the mandate (Rempel and DeStefano 2001; Young and Belenko 2002). 
Alternatively, many problem-solving courts offer considerable inducements to encourage 
compliance including charge reductions and case dismissals. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: Note the average length of the jail or prison alternative that is imposed 
on offenders who fail their mandate and the average legal consequence (e.g., benefit) of 
successful completion.  
 
c. Participants/litigants understand and expect specific court penalties and incentives: Research 
suggests that it is not enough to have leverage over participants; they must also understand and 
believe that a custodial sentence will indeed be imposed if they fail to complete the mandate. The 
RAND framework (Longshore et al. 2001) frames this concept as “predictability.”  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: All of the requisite indicators can be measured with simple dichotomous 
(yes/no) answers as to whether sentence, sanctions, and court rules are specified by the judge 
to the participant; whether they are also provided in writing; and whether sentences for 
failure, sanctions for infractions, and incentives for achievements are applied as promised. 
 
d. Participants/litigants expect sanctions and incentives to match behavior: This objective focuses 
specifically on the use of intermediate sanctions and incentives. Extending the concept of 
predictability introduced above, sanctions and incentives should be specific, clearly explained at 
the outset of court participation, and consistently applied to all participants (see Longshore et al. 
2001; Marlowe and Kirby 1999). Participant, attorney, and other stakeholder views can be 
solicited to examine their perceptions of the predictability of sanctions and incentives. A sample 
of cases can also be examined to determine whether court rules and policies are indeed adhered 
to in practice. More simply, courts can measure whether rules for case advancement and 
sanctions for violations are described somewhere in official policy and procedure materials; and 
whether they are presented in writing to participants. CAVEATS: Domestic violence courts 
generally use interim sanctions only, not positive incentives.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: Record the number and types of common sanctions and incentives. 
Check-off (yes/no) whether the court maintains a schedule linking infractions to sanctions 
and achievements to incentives; adheres to its schedule as a matter of policy (i.e., in virtually 
all instances); and achieves certainty in sanctioning (imposes a sanction in response to every 
infraction, as recommended by the behavior modification literature). 
 
Goal 2: Service Provider Accountability 
All problem-solving courts must maintain awareness of what participants do at community-based 
treatment and social services agencies. The court must be certain that services are based on 
coherent models and that those models are adhered to.  
 
a. Service providers accurately and regularly inform the court about participant progress: Courts 
must be able to affirm that they receive regular, timely, and accurate reports about 
participant/litigant activities, behavior, and compliance. In particular, reports should include 
standardized information such as attendance (days present/late absent); assessment of 
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participation (e.g., regularly contributes to group activities); and drug test results if appropriate. 
Ideally, court administrators will be prepared on occasion to verify the accuracy of the reports.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: A simple dichotomous (yes/no) assessment of whether progress reports 
are received as requested demonstrates provider responsiveness and accountability.  
 
b. Service providers use a specified and effective program model: At a minimum, problem-solving 
court administrators should be able to elicit an understandable and coherent description of 
program goals and strategies for achieving them for service providers. Through site visits or 
review of curricular materials, court administrators should be able to verify the connection 
between services delivered and the program model and to discuss the implications of deviations 
from the model. CAVEATS: Some domestic violence courts may use programs more as an 
appropriate sanction and monitoring tool than because it is believed that the model is efficacious 
as “treatment.” Service providers should still be able to connect the model to best practice 
documents or guidelines. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: Through conversations, review of provider documents, and/or site visits, 
problem-solving court administrators should periodically check-off (yes/no) whether they 
understand the program models that their participants are attending; whether the models are 
supported by literature. 
 
c. Court assesses social service delivery: In addition to relying on information that the court 
requests of service providers, problem-solving courts should maintain service provider 
accountability through verification of state licensing requirements and regular visits to service 
sites. Social service efficacy can also be measured through periodic surveys of 
participants/litigants on the availability and utility of program services. The court should be able 
to demonstrate the mechanisms that are in place to routinely find out what goes on in 
community-based programs and whether program descriptions match actual services and match 
participant perceptions of services. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: Track whether the court verifies licensing compliance (yes/no); and 
whether the court had conducted periodic site visits to community-based providers (yes/no). 
In addition, indicate whether participants are ever surveyed about their experiences in social 
service programs (yes/no). 
 
Goal 3: Court Accountability 
The final goal associated with accountability has to do with the court’s ability to monitor its 
outcomes and hold itself to the same high standards that are expected of participants and 
stakeholders. Accurate data is essential to monitor cases, coordinate supervision with therapeutic 
goals, and assure predictability.  
 
a. Court relies on up-to-date data for case decisions and tracking: The court must be able to 
maintain and use data systems that track participant compliance. The system should not only be 
able to track individual cases but also produce aggregate results, demonstrating the distribution of 
background characteristics, services, compliance, and completion rates among court participants.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: Check-off whether the court maintains: linkage agreements to define 
services and share information with involved agencies; an appropriate spreadsheet or 
 Chapter 5. Performance Indicators for Problem-Solving Courts Page 45
management information system with information from the initial defendant screen and 
assessment; and regularly updated information about participant status in the court, 
compliance and the types of services assigned.  
 
b. Court monitors its implementation and outcomes: Ideally courts will use outside evaluators to 
conduct full evaluations of their programs, but at a minimum, problem-solving courts should 
review and make aggregate data available to stakeholders. In other words, the court should apply 
an action research model of regularly reviewing court performance and implementing operational 
protocols that respond to findings (see Rempel 2005b). 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: Check-off whether the problem-solving court collects and reviews 
aggregate data on participant characteristics, distribution of program types and modalities, 
and compliance information (including graduation rates and time-in-program). The 
information should be collected for everyone who enters the court (not only for graduates) 
and assessed at least annually.  
 
c. Court is coordinated by single point person: As in all organizations, court accountability 
ultimately rests with having a clear operational model and a coherent line of authority. An 
operations manual indicates that a clear court model has been developed. Having a clearly 
identified operational leader who is responsible for implementing court policies, tracking 
outcomes, and reporting to the public about court performance indicates whether an effective 
structure is in place. Cissner and Farole (2009) have documented that in problem-solving justice 
experiments, the absence of strong operational leadership routinely creates implementation 
problems and challenges.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: Confirm the existence of a comprehensive operations manual. Confirm 
whether a single individual, generally a “project coordinator,” has been assigned operational 
leadership (yes/no). 
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Table 5.3 
ACCOUNTABILITY  
 
Court Objective  Performance Indicator  Unit of 
Analysis 
Source and 
Concept 
Notes and 
Caveats 
 
Goal 1: Offender/Litigant Accountability  
 
a. Participant/litigant 
progress monitored ○ 
• Participants/litigants mandated to 
ongoing judicial monitoring hearings 
• Participants/litigants mandated to 
ongoing court-mandated case 
management and/or probation 
supervision  
Number and 
type of 
mandated 
contacts; 
Yes/No 
DCPO (1997) 
identified as 
Frequent 
monitoring; CCI 
(2007) as 
Accountability; and 
Rand (2001) as 
Predictability 
Measures under 
this goal are not 
relevant for civil 
problem-solving 
courts 
b. Participants/litigants 
have practical 
incentive to complete 
court mandates ○ 
• Average sentence or (e.g., in a civil 
court context) other legal consequence 
for failure 
• Average charge, sentence reduction, 
or other positive legal outcome for 
successful completion. 
 
Average 
months/years 
custody or other 
consequence for 
failing; average 
charge and 
sentence upon 
completion 
RAND (2001) 
identified as 
Leverage; CCI 
(2010) 
 
c. Participants/litigants 
understand and expect 
specific court penalties 
and incentives 
• Judge specifies consequences of 
compliance and noncompliance to 
participant (intermediate incentives, 
sanctions, and/or final sentence) 
• Participants/litigants receive written 
document specifying consequences of 
compliance and noncompliance  
• Stated consequences always or nearly 
always adhered to in practice 
Yes/No RAND (2001) 
identified as 
Predictability 
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Court Objective Performance Indicator Unit of 
Analysis 
Source and 
Concept 
Notes and 
Caveats 
d. Participants/litigants 
expect sanctions and 
incentives to match 
behavior  
• Continuum of sanctions and incentives 
are used 
• Court maintains a formal schedule 
linking infractions to sanctions and 
achievements to incentives. 
• Court adheres to schedule 
specifications in practice (i.e., official 
policy dictates adhering to the 
schedule) 
• All or nearly all infractions incur a 
sanction response in practice 
(certainty) 
Types of 
common 
sanctions and 
incentives (first 
indicator); 
Yes/No for all 
other indicators 
RAND (2001) 
identified as 
Predictability; and 
CCI (2007) as 
Accountability 
Domestic violence 
courts do not 
generally use 
positive incentives. 
 
Goal 2: Service Provider Accountability 
 
a. Service providers 
accurately and 
regularly inform court 
about 
participant/litigant 
progress ○ 
• Clinical case and service reports are 
timely and accurate 
• Reports include all pertinent 
information (e.g., details about 
attendance, participation, compliance, 
progress) 
• Reports are provided in specified 
format (paper, oral, electronic) 
 
Yes/No DCPO (1997) 
identified as 
Treatment 
integrated with 
court process; 
NCSC (2003) as 
Integrated Social 
Services and 
Monitoring; and 
Rand (2001) as 
Program Intensity 
Some reports may 
not satisfy all 
specifications, but 
most from a given 
provider should 
meet the 
indicators. If some, 
but not all, 
providers routinely 
deliver inadequate 
reports, courts 
might address the 
problem with the 
provider(s) in 
question. 
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Court Objective Performance Indicator Unit of 
Analysis 
Source and 
Concept 
Notes and 
Caveats 
b. Service providers 
use a specified and 
effective program 
model □ 
• Program model is clearly described in 
provider materials 
• Program has and adheres to an 
operations manual that reflects 
program model 
• Program model is justified by 
literature about treatment efficacy, 
best practices, and/or evidence-based 
practices 
• Participants receive services that 
correspond to program model in 
quality and quantity 
Yes/No Rand (2001) 
identified as 
Program intensity; 
CCI (2010) 
(1) Not all clinical 
and other service 
models have 
established best 
practices, but all 
possible rigor 
should be used to 
assess model 
efficacy. (2) Not 
all domestic 
violence courts use 
programs as 
“treatment” per se. 
c. Court assesses 
social service delivery  
• Court verifies licensing and 
compliance with state requirements  
• Court conducts periodic site visits 
• Court queries participants/litigants 
about experience in social service 
programs (e.g., survey, exit interview) 
• Court addresses participant claims of 
incident with service providers, as 
appropriate 
Number of sites 
visited within 
one year; 
Yes/No to all 
other indicators 
Introduced and 
emphasized in 
project interviews 
and in the Bronx 
roundtable (CCI 
2010)  
Not all assessment 
activities are 
necessary where 
community-based 
programs and 
services are not 
mandated (as in 
some community 
courts). 
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Court Objective Performance Indicator Unit of 
Analysis 
Source and 
Concept 
Notes and Caveats 
 
Goal 3: Court Accountability 
 
a. Court relies on up to 
date data for case 
decisions and tracking 
□○ 
• Information system includes 
screening, assessment, participation 
status, service, and compliance data 
• Court uses linkage agreements to 
define scope of service, share data and 
maintain confidentialty 
Yes/No CCI  (2007) 
identified as 
Enhanced 
information 
Financial constraints 
may prohibit a 
comprehensive 
database, but 
indicator still relevant 
b. Court monitors its 
implementation and 
outcomes 
• Participant characteristics, program 
placement, compliance, and outcome 
information (i.e., graduates and 
failures) collected and aggregated at 
least annually 
• Court shares outcomes with justice 
system and community stakeholders 
Yes/No DCPO (1997) 
identified as 
Program 
Evaluation; and 
CCI (2007) as 
Accountability 
Financial constraints 
may prohibit a 
comprehensive 
database, but 
indicator still 
relevant. 
c. Court coordinated 
by single model and 
point person 
• Dedicated coordinator/manager 
• Court has and adheres to an operations 
manual 
Yes/No NCSC (2003) 
identified as 
Coordinated 
management; and 
CCI (2007) as 
Accountability 
 
○Cross-reference with Collaboration □Cross-reference with Problem-Solving Orientation
 Chapter 6. Indicators for Four Models of Problem-Solving Courts Page 50 
Chapter 6 
Four Models of Problem-Solving:  
Performance Indicators for Drug Courts, Mental Health Courts, 
Domestic Violence Courts, and Community Courts 
 
 
This chapter discusses the application of the aforementioned universal indicators to four common 
problem-solving court models: drug, mental health, domestic violence, and community courts. 
More importantly, the chapter presents four new tables, providing additional goals and 
performance indicators that are unique to these models. 
 
Drug Courts  
Drug courts were the first problem-solving court model and the one that was most often the focus 
of previous conceptual frameworks or discussions of performance indicators (e.g., DCPO 1997; 
Heck 2006; Longshore et al. 2001; Rubio et al. 2008). For this reason, drug courts arguably 
provide the best fit for the indicators introduced in Chapter 5 and require the least 
supplementing. 
 
The few additional indicators listed in Table 6.1 focus on the specific problem of substance 
addiction. First, to understand the target population, it is useful to track some measure of 
problem severity, including drug of choice, years of drug use, age of first use, history in 
treatment and, if possible, scoring results from validated assessment tools.  
 
Most adult drug courts enroll their participants for at least one year, and research indicates that 
the average time to graduation is 15 months (Zweig and Rossman 2010). Consequently, in many 
jurisdictions, the drug court mandate may be particularly suitable for felony offenders, who 
would have elicited a significant probation or custodial sentence in the absence of drug court. 
Those drug courts that do attempt to work with misdemeanor offenders may respond with shorter 
mandates, perhaps ranging from three months to one year at the most. To understand whether the 
court has reached an appropriate match between the participant population and mandate policies, 
drug courts should track the basic criminal justice status of its participants (e.g., percent arrested 
and pleading guilty to, for example, felony vs. misdemeanor charges upon enrollment).  
 
Since drug courts are distinguished from other problem-solving courts by focusing on reduced 
drug use they will want to focus on the use and frequency of drug testing and the percentage of 
participants who achieve significant drug-free periods during participation. It would of course be 
ideal if drug courts could compare the rates of post-program drug use among their participants to 
an appropriate comparison group. While collection of such information may be unfeasible for 
many courts and is therefore not listed, courts could enlist local researchers to examine their 
long-term impact on drug use.  
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Table 6.1 
DRUG COURTS: ADDITIONAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
 
Court Goal Court Objective Performance Indicator Unit of Analysis 
1. Individualized 
screening and 
problem assessment 
(Problem-Solving 
Orientation) 
Targets substance 
abusing participants 
who would 
otherwise merit 
significant court 
intervention (e.g., 
would face a 
significant probation 
or custodial sentence 
in a criminal context)
• Primary drug of 
choice 
• Criminal severity 
(e.g. felony vs. 
misdemeanor; 
likely length of 
sentence) 
Percent with each 
primary drug of choice 
(crack, powder cocaine, 
heroin, 
methamphetamine, 
marijuana, alcohol, 
other); Percent with 
felony vs. misdemeanor 
charges at arrest and, 
again, at enrollment (if 
post-plea model) 
2. Focus on 
outcomes (Problem-
Solving Orientation) 
Reduction in drug 
use 
• Frequency of 
required drug 
testing  
• Percent of 
participants 
achieving drug-
free milestones 
Number of tests 
administered (per week 
or month); Percent 
negative for significant 
period (e.g., 90 days, 4 
months, 8 months) 
 
 
Mental Health Courts 
Like drug courts, mental health courts are also primarily concerned with rehabilitating their 
participants through a lengthy course of treatment. Regarding intake, mental health courts place 
greater emphasis than drug courts on behavioral progress as a continuum, with a focus not on 
complete abstinence but improved social functioning and stability. 
 
The first goals in Table 6.2 encourage mental health courts to report on the nature and severity of 
participants’ underlying mental illness and criminal offenses including the percent whose initial 
charges were violent in nature. 
 
In addition, mental health courts should measure indicators of participant stability, such as health 
care and housing, compliance with prescribed medication management, and avoidance of 
hospitalizations while participating.  
 
Finally, mental health courts should assess whether stakeholders have acquired an appropriate 
perspective on mental illness, recognizing the continuum of symptom severity and challenges of 
recovery – i.e., that expecting absolute and total recovery may be unrealistic. 
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Table 6.2 
MENTAL HEALTH COURTS: ADDITIONAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
 
Court Goal Court Objective Performance Indicator Unit of Analysis 
1. Individualized 
screening and 
problem 
assessment 
(Problem-
Solving 
Orientation) 
Targets participants 
with mental illness 
who would 
otherwise merit 
significant court 
intervention (e.g., a 
significant 
probation or 
custodial sentence) 
• Participants meet 
defined levels of  
mental health need 
(indicated as percent 
with each eligible form 
of mental illness) 
• Criminal severity (e.g. 
felony vs. 
misdemeanor) 
Percent with each 
type of Axis I or Axis 
II diagnosis;  Percent 
with felony vs. 
misdemeanor 
charges; and with 
violent charges at 
arrest and, again, at 
enrollment (if post-
plea model) 
2. Focus on 
outcomes 
(Problem-
Solving 
Orientation)  
Reduction in 
mental health 
symptoms; 
Development of 
independent 
functioning 
• Participants linked with 
appropriate aftercare 
upon completion 
• Participants maintain 
stable health care and 
reduced need for 
hospitalizations 
• Participants have stable 
housing 
• Participants have stable 
financial support 
 
Percent enrolled in 
aftercare at 
graduation; 
Percent compliant 
with medication 
regime; percent with 
hospital admission 
during participation; 
Percent in stable 
housing during 
participation; 
Percent with stable 
health care and 
coverage during 
participation  
3. System change 
(Problem-
Solving 
Orientation, 
cross-referencing 
Collaboration) 
Stakeholders 
understand the 
challenges of 
mental illness and 
view recovery on a 
continuum 
• Court stakeholders 
attend training about 
mental health court-
specific clinical issues 
 
Yes/No 
 
 
Domestic Violence Courts 
Although many domestic violence courts identify offender rehabilitation as an important goal, 
this goal is not universally embraced, and there is a far wider consensus surrounding the goals of 
victim safety and services and offender accountability and (Labriola et al. 2009). Furthermore, 
while domestic violence courts often mandate programs for their offenders, sometimes with 
therapeutic objectives in mind, there is, as yet, little empirical support for their therapeutic 
efficacy (e.g., Babcock et al., 2004; Feder and Wilson 2005; Rempel 2009). As noted previously, 
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this means that some of the indicators listed in Chapter 5 under problem-solving orientation may 
not apply to domestic violence courts. 
 
In table 6.2, we divided performance indicators related to victims into three basic categories:  
 
1. Cohesive and respectful court process for victims: Domestic Violence courts typically 
attempt to improve the court process for victims. By administering surveys or convening 
focus groups Domestic Violence courts can measure whether victims think that they are 
treated fairly and respectfully, that the court process is comprehensible, and that their 
voice is heard.  In the absence of such resource-intensive activities, Table 6.2 identifies a 
few concrete indicators, answerable with yes/no check-offs. Do court staff routinely 
inform victims of the location of advocacy services whenever they appear in court? Doesr 
the court automatically (and promptly) mail any applicable orders of protection? Does the 
court routinely accommodate the scheduling concerns of victims when they must appear 
in court? 
 
2. Victims linked with safety planning and other services: Ideally, domestic violence courts 
can provide an array of services to victims, including safety planning, legal assistance, 
counseling, and housing. We suggest that the courts note which services are available 
onsite and through outside referrals and track the percent of victims connected at some 
point with a victim advocate or service provider. 
 
3. Engage in close offender monitoring: The implementation of close offender supervision 
and reporting requirements can provide victims with important reassurance – and perhaps 
have real effects on their safety as well. We suggest that domestic violence courts track 
the percentage of convicted offenders who are subject to post-conviction supervision by 
the judge or probation. We also suggest that courts indicate (yes/no) whether they 
automatically use protection orders, both temporary orders while a case is pending and 
final orders post-conviction.  
 
In addition to the measures regarding offender accountability highlighted in Chapter 5 the 
research literature makes clear that domestic violence courts are frequently evaluated based on 
their ability to hold offenders accountable through conviction and sentencing on the initial case 
(e.g., see Labriola et al. 2009). Table 6.2 adds performance indicators related to tracking the 
conviction rate and percent of cases receiving each sentence or sentencing condition, including 
jail or prison, probation, and program mandates. 
 
Finally, we propose tracking whether the victim advocacy community has been incorporated into 
court practice and whether the courthouse has made education available on the legal and social 
issues pertaining to domestic violence. Regarding the involvement of victim advocates, their 
involvement can be assessed in terms of meetings (e.g. does a victim services representative 
attend regular stakeholder meetings?) and facilities (e.g. does the courthouse provide space for 
victim advocates to meet with victims?). Regarding courthouse education, we propose a simple 
indicator for whether general courthouse events or trainings have been held. For a more nuanced 
assessment of the effectiveness of education, changes in stakeholder knowledge could also be 
measured, for example using brief before-and-after questionnaires. 
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Table 6.3 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS: ADDITIONAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
 
Court Goal Court Objective Performance Indicator Unit of Analysis 
Cohesive and 
respectful court 
process for 
victim (Problem-
Solving 
Orientation) 
Accommodate and 
acknowledge 
tangible victim needs 
for information and 
services   
 
• Victims informed of 
availability and location 
of services (i.e., of 
victim advocacy staff) 
• Copies of protection 
orders automatically 
mailed to victim (i.e., 
victims are not required 
to appear in court) 
• Victim scheduling and 
other concerns routinely 
accommodated 
 
Yes/No 
Victim safety 
(Problem-
Solving 
Orientation) 
Victims linked with 
safety planning and 
other services 
• Percent of victims linked 
to victim advocate 
• Victim services 
available at courthouse 
or adjacent location 
• Court representatives or 
victim advocates make 
additional community-
based service referrals 
• Separate courthouse 
waiting area established 
for victims 
Percent linked 
to advocates; 
Listing of each 
type of service 
made available 
to victims (1) 
onsite or (2) 
through outside 
referrals; 
Yes/No for 
waiting area 
Victim safety 
(Problem-
Solving 
Orientation) 
Engage in close 
offender monitoring 
• Convicted offenders 
routinely supervised (via 
probation and/or judicial 
status hearings)  
• Enforcement of 
temporary protection 
orders for pending cases 
• Enforcement of final 
protection orders for 
convicted/adjudicated 
cases  
 
Percent of 
convicted 
offenders 
subject to 
supervision 
(excluding 
those sentenced 
to jail); Yes/No 
on protection 
order items 
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Court Goal Court Objective Performance Indicator Unit of Analysis 
Offender 
Accountability at 
disposition and 
sentencing 
(Accountability) 
Track conviction rate 
and sentencing 
outcomes for 
convicted offenders 
(or track dispositions 
in civil domestic 
violence courts) 
• Percent of offenders 
convicted (criminal 
courts) 
• Percent of offenders 
with each key type of 
sentence or condition: 
jail, probation, batterer 
program, other type of 
program, judicial 
monitoring 
Percents 
Collaboration 
with Victim 
Service 
Community 
(Collaboration) 
Increased awareness 
and responsiveness 
to domestic violence 
• Stakeholder or case 
review meetings include 
victim advocate 
• Victim advocates 
receive courthouse space 
to meet with victims 
 
Yes/No 
System Change 
(Problem-
Solving 
Orientation) 
Courthouse-wide 
education efforts 
concerning domestic 
violence 
• Courthouse trainings or 
workshops held (not 
only for domestic 
violence court staff) 
Yes/No 
 
 
Community Courts 
There is an element of community responsiveness in nearly all problem-solving courts. They are 
all established to address community problems that intersect with the justice system, whether 
related to drugs, juvenile delinquency, violence, or other threats to public safety. For this reason, 
all problem-solving courts should arguably be engaged in ongoing dialogue with their 
communities. 
 
Nonetheless, because their mission is explicitly to improve neighborhoods, community courts 
explicitly seek to hold themselves accountable to the communities they serve. Most community 
courts focus on criminal offenses such as vandalism, shoplifting, and prostitution that directly 
affect the everyday quality of life in individual neighborhoods. Some community courts that 
extend their jurisdiction to non-criminal matters (e.g., juvenile or housing cases) generally do so 
in response to an expressly articulated community interest and need.  
 
As shown in Table 6.4, simple indicators of community collaboration and outreach involve the 
creation of a community advisory board (yes/no); frequency of advisory board or other 
community meetings; and the breadth of the community stakeholders attending such meetings. 
The court’s involvement in the community should also be measured through an examination of 
the reciprocity between the two parties – i.e., not only hearing from the community but also 
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disseminating information. Thus, Table 6.4 includes an indicator for how often the court shared 
findings with community members and organizations.  
 
Finally, nearly all community courts seek to restore local communities through community 
service. In this regard, the courts might be expected to track the exact percentage of their 
offenders who are ordered to community service and the quantity of service hours rendered (on 
an annual basis). 
 
Table 6.4 
COMMUNITY COURTS: ADDITIONAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
 
Court Goal Court Objective Performance Indicator Unit of Analysis 
Community 
collaboration 
(Collaboration; 
cross referencing 
Accountability) 
Court solicits 
information about 
community needs; 
information informs 
court operations  
• Community Advisory Board 
(CAB) established 
• Frequency of CAB meetings 
• Frequency of other 
community meetings 
• Range of community 
stakeholders represented in 
meetings and outreach 
Yes/No (advisory 
board established); 
Number of CAB 
meetings/year; Number 
of other community 
meetings/year; 
Affiliations of those 
attending meetings in 
past year 
Community 
collaboration 
(Collaboration; 
cross referencing 
Accountability) 
Court maintains 
community 
presence 
• Court located in community 
• Court communicates findings 
to community stakeholders 
Yes/No; Number of 
times court 
disseminated project 
results in past year 
Community 
restitution 
(Problem-
Solving 
Orientation) 
Court requires 
offenders/litigants 
to perform 
restitution for anti-
social behavior 
• Percent of cases ordered to 
community services 
• Number of hours of 
community service 
performed per year 
Percent of all cases and 
Percent of all convicted 
cases ordered to 
community service; 
Number of hours 
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Chapter 7: Universal Performance Indicators for Problem Solving 
in Traditional Courts 
 
 
In recent years, a number of publications have pointed to the potential for applying problem-
solving principles and practices in traditional courts (e.g., Farole et al, 2004; Farole 2009). In 
fact, many traditional courts already use aspects of problem-solving, alternative sanctions in 
particular. Yet, too often the use of problem-solving methods, even when supported and 
encouraged, is not systematically tracked. Accordingly, this final chapter presents ways that 
traditional criminal and civil courts can measure their problem-solving capacity. We proceed by 
adapting a limited number of indicators that have already been introduced within earlier chapters 
and that are most expeditiously applied to traditional courts. In other words, our aim is to be 
realistic, presenting general courts with a feasible list of measures that can reveal the basic nature 
and extent of their problem-solving activity, without posing an unduly onerous tracking burden. 
A single table (7.1) summarizes all of the essential findings and recommendations. Major themes 
highlighted in the table are briefly summarized in the sections that follow.  
 
Problem-Solving Orientation 
Any court can prioritize and track its use of alternative sanctions. Similarly, any court can 
engage litigants appearing before it and use that engagement to improve the chance of 
compliance and litigant perceptions of court fairness. Even without special resources, courts can 
inform litigants about the court process and encourage service linkages. All such efforts can be 
made with relatively few resources, and many of them require no additional funding at all.  
 
• Individualized Justice. Traditional courts can use an array of mandates such as 
community service and drug treatment. For each type, courts can track the number of 
litigants assigned (per year) and the compliance rate. Without overstepping the line 
distinguishing information from advice, judges and other court staff can provide clarity to 
defendants, for instance asking litigants whether they have questions about the charges or 
the mandates. Such simple measures as direct eye contact, direct address, and moderating 
tone can radically change the experience of litigants (and victims and families). 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: Track service mandates and compliance; Direct interaction with 
litigants; Screening for and access to services; Effort to assess litigant experience. 
 
• Substantive Education for Court Staff. Judges and other key players can convene brown 
bag talks. Outside experts can talk about major populations such as those who are 
substance users, the mentally ill, and non-English speakers. Similarly, court staff can be 
trained on topics as diverse as cultural competency and correlates of re-arrest. Familiarity 
with underlying problems that defendants often have can help improve decision making 
and increase the possibility that the court can serve as a link to needed social services.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: Number and type of problem-solving-related trainings, brown bags 
and presentations per year 
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Table 7.1 
PROBLEM-SOLVING PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR TRADITIONAL COURTS 
 
Problem-Solving 
Goal Objective Performance Indicator Unit of Analysis 
Individualized 
Screening and 
Problem 
Assessment 
(Problem-Solving 
Orientation) 
Potential litigants 
are screened or 
assessed for key 
circumstances and 
needs 
• Court administers psychosocial 
screening or assessment 
instrument at some point pre-
sentence 
• Defendants screened 
specifically for: (a) drug and 
alcohol use, (b) mental illness, 
and (c) prior family court 
involvement 
• Court uses validated screening 
or assessment tool 
• Data sharing agreements put in 
place that protect due process  
Administers screening or 
assessment (Y/N); Screen 
includes drug/alcohol 
use,  mental illness, and 
family court involvement 
(Y/N for each); Uses 
validated tool (Y/N); 
Number of people 
screened or assessed per 
year; Data sharing 
agreements exist (Y/N) 
Individualized 
Treatment or 
Service Mandate 
(Problem-Solving 
Orientation) 
Court links litigants 
to appropriate 
services 
• Community and social 
service/treatment referrals are 
available 
• Number and percent of litigants 
linked to each type of service or 
treatment: i.e., community 
service, drug treatment, mental 
health treatment, batterer 
program, GED class, parenting 
class, etc.) 
Community service 
available (Y/N); number 
and specific types of 
other social or treatment 
services available; 
Number and percent of 
all cases and (for criminal 
matters) of convicted 
cases that are mandated 
to each type of service 
(per year) 
Focus on 
Outcomes 
(Problem-Solving 
Orientation)  
Court achieves 
positive 
outcomes/completion 
rates for litigants 
assigned to each type 
of service 
• Completion/compliance rate for 
cases assigned to each type of 
service (see sample of service 
types under previous 
performance indicator) 
Percent compliant 
(completed mandated) by 
service type 
Direct 
Engagement of 
Participant 
(Problem-Solving 
Orientation) 
Enhance litigant 
understanding and 
confidence in court 
proceedings; solicit 
litigant views about 
their court 
experience  
• Judges receive formal training 
about appropriate level of 
explanation and comment from 
bench (i.e., training in 
“procedural justice” or 
“courtroom communication”)  
• Litigant opportunity to 
comment on experience (e.g. in 
comment box or comment via 
website) 
Yes/No 
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Problem-Solving 
Goal 
Objective Performance Indicator Unit of Analysis 
Courthouse 
Training and 
Education 
(Problem-Solving 
Orientation) 
Educate court staff 
about the context of 
offending and other 
disputes; develop 
culture of discussion 
of themes across 
cases; 
Create links with 
experts outside court 
• Number of problem-solving-
related trainings for staff 
• Number of brown bag and other 
discussion forums re: problem-
solving topics 
• Number of presentations by 
outside experts 
Number and subject 
matter of trainings, expert 
presentations, or other 
forums 
Social Service 
Provider 
Collaboration 
(Collaboration) 
Court fosters 
linkages with 
community-based 
social service 
providers 
 
• Court maintains up-to-date list 
of social service providers 
• Social service providers’ 
materials (brochures, referral 
forms, etc.) available in court 
 
Yes/No; types of social 
services available; types 
used 
Community 
Collaboration: 
Enhance court 
presence in 
community 
(Collaboration) 
Court has presence 
in local community; 
court seeks to 
increase 
understanding of 
court in 
communities; court 
seeks to increase 
usability of court 
websites 
• Presentations about the court 
made to community groups; 
• Materials about the court 
distributed in the community;  
• Court web-site contains detailed 
practical information that 
litigants can use (such as hours, 
required steps for common 
concerns such as divorce or 
family court filings) 
Presentations ever made 
(Yes/No); Number of 
presentations (per year); 
Number of community 
sites with materials 
available about the court; 
Court web content lists 
hours, courthouse 
locations, and steps to 
take for pro se filings 
(Y/N) 
Early 
Coordination of 
Information 
(Accountability) 
Court is responsive 
to litigant need for 
information; Court 
seeks all relevant 
information 
pertaining to a case 
• Court informational materials, 
forms and other relevant 
information available for 
litigants; 
• Court routinely collects relevant 
case information  
Yes/No; content of 
informational materials is 
clear and accurate (Y/N); 
Court uses checklist of 
potentially relevant 
information to consider 
(Y/N) 
Compliance 
Review 
(Accountability) 
Court requires 
defendants to return 
to court to report on 
compliance with 
mandates 
• Compliance reviews are 
routinely held 
• Average number of compliance 
reviews 
Yes/No; Number of 
compliance reviews per 
case(per year)/ Total 
number of cases 
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Problem-Solving 
Goal 
Objective Performance Indicator Unit of Analysis 
Court 
Accountability 
(Accountability) 
Court relies on up to 
date data for case; 
court routinely 
assesses data to track 
compliance and 
examine court 
outcomes 
 
• Court has data system that 
tracks mandates to problem-
solving interventions (e.g. 
community service, drug 
treatment, treatment readiness, 
mental health treatment, GED, 
and job training); and that 
tracks the compliance outcome 
for each case 
• Data system is accurate and 
routinely updated 
• Data regularly analyzed (e.g., 
annually) and findings 
appropriately discussed 
Yes/No 
 
 
 
Collaboration 
Traditional courts can use collaboration with service providers and community partners identify 
litigant needs and increase public confidence in justice. 
 
• Links with Community-Based Agencies. Such links can provide courts with resources to 
address litigant and family needs including drug treatment, community service, and job 
training. These services may be used in combination with traditional sentences or as 
alternative sentences. Collaboration between agencies and courts can serve the interest of 
both because the court gets services and the agencies get clients. Relationships with 
community-based agencies can assist civil and family as well as criminal courts. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: Number of community based agency partners 
 
• Court presence in community can be bolstered by hosting site visits from community 
groups, expanding information about the court that is available on-line and in libraries, 
schools and other public centers, and encouraging transparency in how courts operate. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: Number of community outreach initiatives 
 
Accountability 
A problem-solving approach to accountability links concerns of due process and public safety 
with rehabilitative goals. Several facets of accountability require almost no additional cost to 
courts and can easily be assessed.  
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• Compliance Reviews that require the defendant or litigants to report back to the court 
allow the judge to track compliance and behavior change. They also demonstrate to 
defendants and litigants that the court watches and cares about their behavior. Finally, 
they provide an ongoing opportunity for the court to communicate with litigants and 
defendants and to respond to their concerns and circumstances. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: Use and number of adjournments 
 
• Early Coordination of Information. Courts that provide up-to-date information to litigants 
and family members address the needs of court users to understand the process and assist 
court users in preparing and filing necessary paperwork. And by providing information 
about cases -- including, wherever possible, information about litigants’ underlying social 
service needs --  to the judge and other court actors, traditional courts can help improve 
the quality of court orders and encourage individualized justice. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: Availability and content of materials for and from litigants  
 
• Court Data Systems. Courts that invest in electronic data systems can use that 
information to provide monitoring details about defendants to judges. Data systems can 
also be used to aggregate data and examine overall impact of the court on case outcomes.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: Electronic database used; Compliance data maintained; Awareness 
of caseload characteristics by key court staff. 
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